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SUPREMACY OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE:   
A GARAMENDI-BASED FRAMEWORK 
FOR ASSESSING STATE LAW  




State and local governments across the United States increasingly act in 
areas that intersect with foreign policy.  Federalism concerns and U.S. 
foreign relations are thus in constant tension. 
In American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
2003 both expanded and detracted from where states and localities may 
permissibly act in areas that touch upon foreign affairs.  This Note works 
within the confines of Garamendi to outline four distinct categories of state 
action that might intersect with foreign relations.  It discusses how lower 
courts, namely the Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, and the Northern 
District of Illinois, have categorized each type of case in recent 
interpretations of Supreme Court precedent.  This Note does not advocate 
for or against the Court’s analysis in Garamendi.  Rather, it argues that 
lower courts should minimize inconsistencies—which have become quite 
common—by categorizing all state actions that touch upon foreign affairs 
pursuant to this distinct framework in accordance with Garamendi. 
This Note’s typology acknowledges the Court’s expansion of Supremacy 
Clause-based conflict preemption in the foreign affairs realm, and it argues 
that:  (1) state actions that add on to existing federal policy—specifically 
economic sanctions on foreign regimes—are categorically impermissible 
because such “pile ons” conflict with federal policy, and (2) where there is 
legitimately no federal policy on a specific subject matter, there can be no 
conflict.  And in the absence of a conflict, states may constitutionally act 
pursuant to their police powers, even if their actions intersect with foreign 
affairs. 
This Note further argues that Garamendi’s expansion of conflict 
preemption significantly diminishes the weight of the dormant foreign 
affairs doctrine and that foregoing a Supremacy Clause analysis in favor of 
Zschernig v. Miller’s dormant foreign affairs doctrine would only be 
appropriate where a state reaches beyond its police power. 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2015, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2011, Cornell University.  
Thank you to Professor Thomas H. Lee for his guidance and insight and my family and 
friends for their love and encouragement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During and immediately after World War I, the Ottoman Empire 
undertook a series of campaigns to kill or expel the ethnic Armenians 
within its borders.1  A century later, both the Ottoman Empire and its 
successor, present-day Turkey, have failed to acknowledge, express 
remorse for, or take responsibility for the genocide.2
Turkey is a valuable and strategic ally of the United States.
 
3  The alliance 
has been crucial to U.S. interests in the region given the constant turmoil in 
the Middle East throughout recent decades.4  Presumably out of fear of 
endangering this relationship, the U.S. government has never officially 
recognized these events as genocide.5  Nonetheless, approximately forty 
U.S. states have officially acknowledged the Armenian genocide, without 
apparent repercussions for the U.S.-Turkey relationship.6
Recently, California went beyond mere recognition of the genocide in the 
Ottoman Empire.
 
7  In 2000, the California legislature extended the statute 
of limitations for life insurance claims against insurance companies that 
issued policies to Armenians in the Ottoman Empire prior to the genocide 
but never paid out on those policies.8
 
 1. See SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”:  AMERICA AND THE AGE OF 
GENOCIDE 1–2 (2002). 
  The extension of the limitations 
 2. See Jeffrey W. Stempel et al., Stoney Road out of Eden:  The Struggle to Recover 
Insurance For Armenian Genocide Deaths and Its Implications for the Future of State 
Authority, Contract Rights, and Human Rights, 18 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 40, 76–79 
(2012); Adam B. Schiff, Time to Recognize the Armenian Genocide, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 
2009, at A11 (“For over 90 years, Turkey has refused to recognize this dark chapter of its 
Ottoman past . . . .”).  Indeed, acknowledging the Armenian killings as genocide is a crime 
under the Turkish penal code. See Sebnem Arsu, Turkey Seethes at the U.S. over House 
Genocide Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007, at A12. 
 3. See Remarks by President Obama and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan After 
Meeting, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Apr. 6, 2009), available at 
http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-and-pm-turkey-after-meeting; 
G. Lincoln McCurdy, Armenian Genocide Resolution, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2010, at A20 
(noting that 90 percent of all supplies going to U.S. troops in Iraq go through channels in 
Turkey and that Turkey manages the logistics for NATO operations in Afghanistan). 
 4. See McCurdy, supra note 3. 
 5. See Peter Baker, Obama Marks Genocide Without Saying the Word, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 25, 2010, at A10. 
 6. See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian II), 629 F.3d 901, 907 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (listing some of the states that have organized events and speeches to 
commemorate the Armenian genocide), overruled by Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung 
AG (Movsesian III), 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2795 
(2013).  Additionally, approximately twenty-one countries have officially recognized the 
Armenian killings as genocide. See ALEXANDER-MICHAEL HADJILYRA, THE ARMENIANS OF 
CYPRUS 32 (2009). 
 7. See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d 1067. 
 8. See id. at 1069–70. 
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period led to a settlement with New York Life Insurance Company.9  It 
would have enabled claimants—descendants of policy beneficiaries—to 
collect from European insurance companies.10  But one of these European 
insurance companies, Munich Re, challenged the statute at the appellate 
level.11  Ultimately in 2012, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the California 
statute on the ground that it impermissibly interfered with the federal 
government’s authority over foreign affairs.12
The Ninth Circuit’s invalidation of the California legislation raises the 
question of the proper balance between federalism—respect for a state’s 
autonomy as preserved by the U.S. constitutional balance—and the need for 
the United States to design and implement a coherent and uniform foreign 
policy.  This topic has been heavily debated since the founding of the 
United States.
 
13  The reality is that the scope of traditional state police 
powers and the foreign policy of the United States do not fit neatly into two 
separate spheres.14  Federalism and foreign policy are thus in constant 
tension, and the Supreme Court has addressed foreign affairs federalism 
cases in many different contexts.15
Many cases involving the intersection between foreign affairs and 





 9. See Stempel, supra note 
 which (2) has affected or seems likely to affect the relations 
2, at 54–55. 
 10. See id.  
 11. See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1071; see also Stempel, supra note 2, at 55. 
 12. See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1076. 
 13. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (holding that 
the federal government possesses an elevated level of control over foreign affairs, beyond 
the powers enumerated in the Constitution); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) 
(holding that international treaties preempt state law); see also Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal 
Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1621 (1997). 
 14. See, e.g., Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206, 1207–08 (11th 
Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (discussing the Florida statute prohibiting the allocation of state 
university funds for state employee travel to countries designated as “State Sponsors of 
Terrorism”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 21 (2012). 
 15. See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (state law on 
immigration); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (state imposition of capital 
punishment in contravention of international agreements); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 
U.S. 396 (2003) (state insurance laws assisting victims of human rights abuses abroad); 
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (state economic sanctions on 
foreign sovereign); Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (state tax 
on global activities of a corporation located within state); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 
203 (1942) (state cause of action for monetary claims against foreign nations).  Often, state 
and local governments are compelled to act because they can respond more quickly to their 
citizens’ demands than the federal government. See, e.g., Howard N. Fenton, III, The Fallacy 
of Federalism in Foreign Affairs:  State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 563, 578 (1993) (“While the Reagan Administration in the 1980’s 
steadfastly resisted imposing sweeping sanctions against the white-minority government in 
South Africa, the initiative was taken by states and cities across the country.”). 
 16. See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 754 F.3d 712, 718–19 
(9th Cir. 2014); Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 408–09; Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1077; Winn, 616 
F.3d at 1207–08; Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 741–42 
(N.D. Ill. 2007). 
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between the United States and foreign nations and parties,17 and (3) a U.S. 
court has been asked to invalidate the state law because it interferes with or 
contravenes the foreign policy preferences and freedom of action of 
national actors.18  Throughout history, these cases have been analyzed 
through a variety of frameworks.19
The intersection between federalism and foreign affairs has been a hot 
topic among constitutional scholars.
 
20  There are two general schools of 
thought.  One side reflects the idea that in the area of foreign affairs, the 
federal government holds exclusive supremacy, and so state statutes that 
seem likely to affect the relations that intersect with foreign affairs are 
treated with less deference.21  The opposing side asserts that the federal 
government is subject to the same constitutional restraints in foreign affairs 
as in domestic affairs, and that the powers of the three branches of the 
national government over foreign affairs are confined to those affirmatively 
granted by the Constitution.22  Much literature on the foreign affairs-
federalism debate has focused on (1) supporting or disavowing foreign 
affairs exceptionalism,23 (2) fitting foreign affairs into preexisting 
paradigms of conflict or field preemption,24 and (3) most narrowly, simply 
reconciling the confusing thicket of Supreme Court precedents on the 
question.25
 
 17. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420–21; Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1077; Winn, 616 
F.3d at 1207–08; Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 741–42. 
  But there has been less attention paid to the facts of specific 
cases, in which the tension between federalism and foreign affairs has 
exhibited itself, and the possibility of formulating a solution based on a 
 18. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413; Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1070–71; Winn, 616 
F.3d at 1207; Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 737. 
 19. See generally Crosby, 530 U.S. 363; Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); see 
also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1075–76. 
 20. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 150, 
162–65 (2d ed. 1996); Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 175; Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 649 (2002). 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (“It 
results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty 
did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.”); Beth Stephens, The Law of 
Our Land:  Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
393, 441 (1997). 
 22. See generally Carlos Manuel Vázquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259 
(2001); see also Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1676–77. 
 23. See, e.g., Daniel Abebe & Aziz Z. Huq, Foreign Affairs Federalism:  A Revisionist 
Approach, 66 VAND. L. REV. 723 (2013); Michael D. Ramsey, Review Essay:  Textbook 
Revisionism, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1111, 1116–19 (2003) (reviewing CURTIS A. BRADLEY & 
JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS (2002)). 
 24. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 20; Matthew Schaefer, Constraints on State-Level 
Foreign Policy:  (Re)Justifying, Refining and Distinguishing the dormant Foreign Affairs 
Doctrine, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 201, 307–08 (2011); Joseph B. Crace, Jr., Note, Gara-
Mending the Doctrine of Foreign Affairs Preemption, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 225 (2004). 
 25. See, e.g., Abebe & Huq, supra note 23.  Additionally, scholars have explored the 
balance of power on foreign affairs within the federal government itself. See generally Risa 
E. Kaufman, “By Some Other Means”:  Considering the Executive’s Role in Fostering 
Subnational Human Rights Compliance, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1971 (2012). 
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typology of the different sorts of cases.  This Note seeks to mitigate lower 
courts’ confusion26
The intersection between foreign affairs and federalism arises in a variety 
of situations as the world becomes more globalized.
 in this area. 
27  This Note leaves it 
to others to debate foreign affairs exceptionalism, reconcile foreign affairs 
federalism with general preemption doctrines, and balance the powers 
within the federal government.  Instead, this Note provides a snapshot of 
the current state of the ever-changing balance between federalism and 
foreign affairs in four distinct fact patterns28 in light of the Supreme Court’s 
relatively recent decisions in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi29 and 
Medellín v. Texas30 and recent manifestations in lower courts.  Recently, 
lower courts have struggled with the intersection between federalism and 
foreign affairs in two distinct situations:  (1) where the state legislature has 
supplemented existing federal economic sanctions on a country by enacting 
its own sanctions against foreign sovereigns,31 and (2) where the state 
legislature acts pursuant to its police power to regulate insurance claims for 
victims of human rights abuses abroad, for which there is no existing 
federal policy on point.32
Part I of this Note outlines the development of perspectives on the 
intersection of foreign affairs and federalism from the founding of the 
Constitution to present day.  It discusses the key Supreme Court decisions 
that have provided the framework for invalidating state laws that intersect 
with foreign affairs:  Zschernig v. Miller,
 
33 Crosby v. National Foreign 
Trade Council,34
 
 26. See, e.g., Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. Ill. 
2007). 
 and Garamendi.  Part I culminates in a discussion of 
 27. See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS & JOHN C. BLAKEMAN, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND 
NEW FEDERALISM:  FROM THE REHNQUIST TO THE ROBERTS COURT 190 (2012) (noting “a 
structural change . . . that has begun to transform the global order of unitary nation-states 
into a system that empowers subfederal units such as the American states”); Sandra L. 
Lynch, The United States, the States, and Foreign Relations, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 217, 
219 (2000); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1247–
48 (1999).  For instance, two New York State lawmakers recently threatened to strip aid and 
bonding privileges to public and private universities that participate in organizations such as 
the American Studies Association that have imposed academic boycotts on Israel. See Ken 
Lovett, 2 NYS Lawmakers Want to Yank State Funding from Colleges Supporting Israeli 
Boycott, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 27, 2013, 11:47 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
blogs/dailypolitics/1.1697658. 
 28. Namely, these are where a state:  (1) attempts to add on to an existing federal 
economic sanctions regime by imposing its own sanctions on a foreign country; (2) legislates 
pursuant to its police power in an area that intersects with foreign affairs but does not 
conflict with any federal law; (3) legislates beyond its police power to significantly impact 
foreign affairs; or (4) legislates beyond its police power but does not create impermissible 
effects on foreign affairs. See infra Part II. 
 29. 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 30. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 31. See, e.g., Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(per curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 21 (2012); Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731. 
 32. See, e.g., Movsesian III, 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 2795 (2013). 
 33. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 34. 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
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Garamendi—the Supreme Court’s most recent pro-national government 
attempt to articulate a general framework—and a discussion of Medellín—
the Court’s most recent statement on the unitary foreign policy-or-
federalism deference issue, which was decisively resolved in favor of the 
states.  Part II explores lower court decisions and categorizes the decisions 
into groups.  Part III articulates a framework for dealing with state laws 
with potentially serious implications for the relations between the United 
States and foreign parties based on the typology introduced in Part II.  This 
framework turns significantly on whether there is some affirmative federal 
government legislation or policy on point and on whether the state law in 
question is plausibly grounded in a traditional police power. 
I.   AN ONGOING TENSION BETWEEN FEDERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY 
This part outlines the evolution of the foreign affairs “preemption” 
doctrines from the founding of the United States to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Garamendi.  It then discusses the impact of Garamendi on the 
preexisting foreign affairs preemption doctrines and the Court’s recent 
decision in Medellín. 
First, Part I.A. explains the balance between federalism and federal 
foreign affairs and how that balance has shifted in recent decades as the 
Court has dealt with foreign affairs preemption.  Next, Part I.B discusses 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Garamendi, which invalidated a state law 
facilitating Holocaust-era insurance claims, because it conflicted with 
federal executive policy.  Parts I.B also outlines the impact of Garamendi 
on the two distinct doctrines developed by Crosby and Zschernig.  Lastly, 
Part I.C discusses Medellín, the Court’s most recent case dealing with 
foreign affairs and federalism. 
A.   Foreign Affairs and Federalism 
Before American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi 
Part I.A.1 discusses the constitutional provisions that address the balance 
between federalism concerns and the federal foreign affairs power.  It 
examines the circumstances in which federal law might preempt state laws 
that interfere with the federal power over foreign affairs.  Next, Part I.A.2 
examines the Supreme Court’s expansion of foreign affairs preemption in 
Zschernig, where a state law was held invalid because it encroached too far 
on the federal government’s power over foreign affairs despite the absence 
of any conflict between the state and federal laws.  Part I.A.3 examines the 
criticism of and retreat from Zschernig in the years following.  Part I.A.4 
discusses the Court’s opinion in Crosby, which invalidated a state statute 
for attempting to impose economic sanctions on Burma, because it was an 
obstacle to compliance with the coexisting federal statutory sanctions 
regime. 
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1.   The Constitutional Balancing of Federalism with Foreign Affairs 
The Framers of the Constitution were indeed concerned with federalism 
and ensuring that the states retained significant powers,35 but they 
recognized that the federal government should control the foreign affairs of 
the nation.36  In Federalist 42, James Madison wrote, “[i]f we are to be one 
nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.”37  
Likewise, in Federalist 80, Alexander Hamilton wrote, “the peace of the 
WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART.  The Union will 
undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its 
members.”38  As recognized by the Founders, state involvement in foreign 
affairs could have negative consequences.39
The Constitution reflects the idea that “the nation must speak with one 
voice, not fifty”
 
40 in global affairs.41  Accordingly, the Constitution grants 
the federal government plenary, but not explicitly exclusive, power over 
foreign affairs.42  Article I, Section 10 explicitly prohibits the states from 
performing certain foreign affairs functions, including entering into a 
“treaty, alliance, or confederation.”43  Article I, Section 8 and Article II 
affirmatively grant the legislative and executive branches power to 
“conduct foreign relations through the enactment of federal statutes, 
treaties, and executive agreements.”44  The Supremacy Clause in Article VI 
states that these federal enactments are supreme over state law.45
 
 35. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (“The powers delegated by the proposed 
Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined.  Those which are to remain in 
the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.”). 
  Under 
Article III, the federal judiciary has power over cases concerning federal 
statutes, treaties, executive agreements, and controversies involving 
 36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). 
 37. Id. 
 38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 39. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968) (“[State] regulations must give 
way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy.”); see also Nick 
Robinson, Citizens Not Subjects:  U.S. Foreign Relations Law and the Decentralization of 
Foreign Policy, 40 AKRON L. REV. 647, 648 (2007) (“A misstep in foreign affairs by a state 
or local government can have adverse and potentially devastating effects on the entire 
country.  If a state or local government adopts a position that differs from official federal 
foreign policy, it fractures the country’s voice and negotiating power abroad.”). 
 40. Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1621. 
 41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1 cmt. 5 (1987) (noting that a state “of the United States is not a ‘state’ under international 
law . . . since by its constitutional status it does not have capacity to conduct foreign 
relations.”). 
 42. See Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1619 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; art. II). 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 44. Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1619; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; art. II. 
 45. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  The Supremacy Clause reads:  “This Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law 
of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Id. 
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foreigners.46  Further, the Take Care Clause in Article II authorizes the 
President to enforce federal enactments.47
But federal sovereignty over foreign affairs must be balanced with the 
Tenth Amendment, which states that “[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
 
48
State actions that intersect with foreign affairs have been analyzed under 
various preemption doctrines.
  Thus, state laws 
could presumably intersect with foreign affairs if outside of those powers 
expressly allocated to the federal government. 
49  Generally, if a state action interferes with 
federal power over foreign affairs, the state action is preempted by federal 
law, and is thus unconstitutional.50
Federal preemption of state law may be either express or implied.
   
51  
Express preemption occurs where a federal law contains an explicit 
preemption clause, or Congress’s intention to preempt state law is implicit 
in the statutory structure.52  There are three types of implied preemption53:  
(1) conflict preemption, where it is impossible to comply with both federal 
and state law,54 (2) obstacle preemption, where a state statute “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment” of the “purposes and objectives” of a 
federal law,55 and (3) field preemption, where a federal regulatory scheme 
is “so pervasive” that “Congress left no room for the States to supplement 
it,”56 or there is such a dominant “federal interest” in the field that state law 
is preempted.57
 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 49. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419–20 (2003) (applying 
conflict preemption and discussing field preemption); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (applying conflict, or obstacle, preemption); Zschernig v. 
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (applying dormant foreign affairs preemption). 
 50. See, e.g., Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 401. 
 51. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 433–34 
(4th ed. 2011). 
 52. See Cindy Galway Buys & Grant Gorman, Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung and 
the Scope of the President’s Foreign Affairs Power to Preempt Words, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
205, 208 (2012).  For example, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act provides that 
it “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit 
plan” covered by the Act. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) 
(2012).  Additionally, the federal copyright statute preempts any “legal or equitable rights 
that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of [federal] 
copyright [law].” 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012). 
 53. See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 433–34; Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 
202–08.  However, these categories are not “rigidly distinct,” and both obstacle preemption 
and field preemption can be considered species of conflict preemption. English v. Gen. Elec. 
Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990). 
 54. See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 434.  In such cases, “there is evidence 
of clear conflict” between federal and state policies, so federal law preempts state law. Am. 
Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 418, 421 (2003). 
 55. See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 434 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 56. English, 496 U.S. at 79. 
 57. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
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The Constitution does not explicitly grant exclusive power over foreign 
affairs to the federal government.58  But given all of the constitutional 
provisions on federal foreign affairs power,59 the Supreme Court has at 
times read a federal preemptive power over foreign affairs into the 
Constitution.60  Federal law indisputably preempts state law where there is 
an explicit conflict between a treaty or executive agreement and the state 
law.61  In the late 1930s, the Court held that the executive branch had the 
authority to unilaterally make foreign policy agreements that would 
preempt state law.62  The Court then asserted that “[p]ower over external 
affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government 
exclusively.”63
2.   The Cold War:  Expansion of Preemption and Federal Exclusivity in 
Foreign Affairs 
 
In the wake of World War II, the Supreme Court first recognized that a 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine might act to invalidate state laws that 
intrude into the federal domain of foreign affairs, even in the absence of an 
explicit conflict with federal law.64
In Clark v. Allen,
 
65 the Supreme Court confronted a California statute 
that restricted the rights of nonresident aliens to inherit property in 
California.66  The state statute provided that a nonresident alien could 
inherit property in the state only if the individual’s respective country 
offered U.S. citizens the same reciprocal right of inheritance.67  The 
Supreme Court upheld the statute with respect to personal property,68
 
 58. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; HENKIN, supra note 
 
20, at 156; supra note 48 and 
accompanying text. 
 59. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 60. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315–16 (1936) 
(noting that the federal government possesses the authority to make foreign policy, even 
though it is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution and that the Tenth Amendment did 
not reserve to the states power over foreign affairs). 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230–31 (1942); 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 
331 (1937). 
 62. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330 (“[T]he Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ 
of [the federal] government.”). 
 63. Pink, 315 U.S. at 233; see also Hines, 312 U.S. at 61, 63 (“The Federal 
Government . . . is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs 
with foreign sovereignties.”). 
 64. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 516–17 (1947).  This doctrine is commonly 
analyzed under the rubric of field preemption, which pins it to the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 398 (2003).  Others refer 
to it as the federal common law of foreign relations, referring to judge-made law. See 
generally Goldsmith, supra note 13.  Often, it is referred to plainly as the dormant foreign 
affairs doctrine with no underpinnings in the Supremacy Clause. See Schaefer, supra note 
24, at 299. 
 65. 331 U.S. 503 (1947). 
 66. See id. at 506. 
 67. See id. at 506 n.1. 
 68. See id. at 517.  However, the statute was preempted with respect to real property by 
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights. See id. at 517–18. 
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noting that even though this aspect of the statute might have an “incidental 
or indirect effect in foreign countries,” it did not cross a “forbidden line.”69  
Although it upheld the statute, the Clark Court acknowledged the existence 
of a limitation on state action based on the extent of its effects abroad.70
Only in 1968 did the Supreme Court first find a state law preempted by 
federal law in the absence of any conflict with federal law on the basis of a 
federal dormant foreign affairs power.
 
71  In Zschernig v. Miller, the 
Supreme Court was presented with a nearly identical statute to the one at 
issue in Clark.72  The Oregon courts had applied an Oregon escheat statute 
to deny a property inheritance to a resident of East Germany.73  The Oregon 
statute prohibited inheritance of in-state property by foreigners unless they 
could show that their home country would not confiscate the property and 
offered American citizens reciprocal rights of inheritance.74  This required a 
local probate court to inquire into the details of foreign law.75  Although 
there was no explicit conflict with federal law, the Supreme Court overruled 
the Oregon statute because encouraging local courts to base decisions on 
inquiries into international law intruded into foreign affairs,76 a “domain of 
exclusively federal competence.”77
In its decision, the Zschernig Court relied on the “incidental or indirect 
effect” language from Clark to strike down the statute.
 
78  The Court 
acknowledged that the Oregon statute had “more than ‘some incidental or 
indirect effect in foreign countries’” and was consequently impermissibly 
unconstitutional, a violation of the allegedly exclusive power of the federal 
government over the foreign affairs of the nation.79  Although the “more 
than some incidental or indirect effect” language was used once, the Court 
employed other phrases throughout the opinion to justify its decision, 
spurring subsequent confusion over the proper test to apply to invalidate a 
statute based on Zschernig’s new and expansive dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine.80  The Court noted that the statute created a “great potential” for 
“disruption” of U.S. foreign relations, or “embarrassment” for the nation as 
a whole.81
 
 69. Id. at 517. 
  Further, the statute “affect[ed] international relations in a 
 70. See Schaefer, supra note 24, at 236. 
 71. See generally Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 72. Id.; see supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. 
 73. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430. 
 74. See id. at 430–31. 
 75. See id. at 435, 440. 
 76. See id. at 441. 
 77. Id. at 442 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 78. See id. at 458 (Harlan, J., concurring).  But Zschernig was distinguishable from 
Clark because the Oregon statute in Zschernig involved an as-applied challenge, whereas 
Clark involved a facial challenge. See id. at 433 (majority opinion).  The problem with the 
Oregon statute in Zschernig was that probate courts were inquiring into foreign government 
policies and activities, which unconstitutionally invaded the federal foreign affairs power. 
See id. at 433–34.  Such actions had not yet occurred in Clark, although they were probable 
effects of the statute there as well. See id. at 432–34. 
 79. Id. at 434. 
 80. See infra notes 95–109 and accompanying text. 
 81. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434–35. 
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persistent and subtle way,” had a “direct impact upon foreign relations,” 
and might have “adversely affect[ed] the power of the central government 
to deal with [foreign relations] problems.”82  The Court also noted that the 
Oregon statute might “impair the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign 
policy” or lead to serious “international controversies.”83  Regardless of the 
exact standard it put forth, Zschernig stood for the proposition that a state 
statute that does not conflict with any federal law may still be struck down 
for reaching too far into the field of foreign affairs.84
In his concurring opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan II expressed 
skepticism over the possibility of preempting state laws in traditional state 
areas that had only a modest impact on foreign relations.
 
85  He argued that 
the majority’s broad reading of the federal power over foreign affairs was 
unsupported and unsustainable.86  He noted that the majority’s main 
problem with the Oregon statute was that it encouraged state court judges to 
evaluate the policies of foreign governments.87  He suggested that there 
were no actual foreign affairs effects and that this concern was speculative, 
as state court evaluation of foreign law has never “had any foreign relations 
consequence whatsoever.”88  Thus, Justice Harlan might have overruled the 
state statute only if there was an indication of actual effects abroad.  
Accordingly, he noted that the state law did not interfere with U.S. conduct 
abroad, as even the Solicitor General of the United States had filed an 
amicus brief denying that the state policy conflicted with federal foreign 
policy.89
What was the reach of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine after 
Zschernig?
 
90  Since Zschernig, the Supreme Court has not overturned a 
state law because of the dormant foreign affairs power in the absence of an 
explicit conflict between federal and state law.91
 
 82. Id. at 440–41. 
  Accordingly, scholars 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 418 (2003). 
 85. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 443–62 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 86. See id.  Justice Harlan ultimately concurred in the judgment because he found that 
the Oregon statute conflicted with U.S. treaty obligations with Germany. See id. at 443. 
 87. See id. at 461 (“Essentially, the Court’s basis for decision appears to be that alien 
inheritance laws afford state court judges an opportunity to criticize in dictum the policies of 
foreign governments, and that these dicta may adversely affect our foreign relations.”). 
 88. Id. at 460. 
 89. See id. (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Zschernig v. Miller, 389 
U.S. 429 (1968) (No. 21), 1967 WL 113577, at *6 n.5). 
 90. See HENKIN, supra note 20, at 164 (“Zschernig v. Miller . . . imposed additional 
limitations on the states, but what they are and how far they reach still remain to be 
determined. . .  . [I]t will be largely for the courts, and may take many years and many cases, 
to develop the distinctions and draw the lines that will define the Zschernig limitations on 
the states.”); see also Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts:  
Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1059 (1967) (noting the complexity of 
this question, deeming scholarship on the scope of Zschernig as “very sketchy treatment of a 
complex subject”). 
 91. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 439 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has never relied on Zschernig for a 
decision); see also Robinson, supra note 39, at 658 (“The continued ambiguity surrounding 
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have questioned whether this power exists anymore, referring to the 
doctrine as a “relic of the Cold War.”92  But the Court has not explicitly 
indicated that Zschernig should be overturned and has acknowledged its 
continued survival in subsequent decisions.93
3.   Retreating from Zschernig v. Miller 
 
Fearing that the federal government had usurped too much power, 
commentators expressed disapproval of the federal government’s new 
monopoly over foreign affairs.94  Critics of the doctrine believed that 
foreign affairs preemption should be narrowly defined and should only be 
used where the federal government has expressly articulated a policy.95  
Professor Louis Henkin noted that the idea that “the new United States 
government was to have major powers outside the Constitution is not 
intimated in the Constitution itself, in the records of the Convention, in the 
Federalist Papers, or in contemporary debates.”96  Likewise, Professor Jack 
L. Goldsmith criticized the theory that the federal government holds 
exclusive authority in the field of foreign affairs, outside of the powers 
enumerated in the Constitution.97  He noted that this was contrary to the 
intent of the Founders, not written explicitly in the Constitution, and 
unsupported by any case law prior to 1936.98  Most of the Zschernig critics 
dispute the concept of “foreign affairs exceptionalism,”99 the concept and 
practice of resolving foreign affairs issues under a different framework from 
domestic issues.100
In Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California,
 
101 
California had imposed a state tax on multinational corporations.102  The 
plaintiffs asserted that such a tax regime impaired federal uniformity and 
prevented the United States from “speaking with one voice in international 
trade,” in violation of the dormant Foreign Commerce Cause.103  The Court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments, holding that the judiciary lacked power to 
decide how to balance foreign relations effects with state autonomy.104
 
the sweeping doctrine Zschernig suggests has created much uncertainty about the scope of 
judicial preemption of localities’ actions that affect foreign relations.”). 
  
Instead, the Court indicated that this was an issue for the federal legislature 
and that Congress was the only entity suited to determine whether a state 
 92. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 20, at 165 n.**. 
 93. See, e.g., Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 439. 
 94. See infra notes 95–100. 
 95. See Crace, supra note 24, at 208 (citing Ramsey, supra note 23, at 1116–19). 
 96. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 19–20. 
 97. See Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1659–60. 
 98. See id. 
 99. Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1089, 1104–07 (1999) (discussing “foreign affairs exceptionalism”). 
 100. See Vázquez, supra note 22, at 1259–60. 
 101. 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
 102. See id. at 301–03. 
 103. Id. at 320 (quoting Japan Line Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)) 
(citation omitted). 
 104. See id. at 328. 
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action impermissibly interferes with foreign affairs.105  Further, the Court 
noted that congressional silence on the issue created a presumption that the 
state action was permissible.106
Although Barclays Bank was based on the dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause,
 
107 some scholars believed that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Barclays Bank eliminated Zschernig’s dormant foreign affairs doctrine.108  
Accordingly, Professor Edward Swaine noted that “to those skeptical of 
federal judicial power, Barclays Bank was not unlike a powerful general-
purpose pesticide:  whatever the foreign relations doctrines were, it killed 
them.”109
4.   Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council:  The Supreme Court Keeps 
Zschernig v. Miller on Life Support 
 
In 2000, the Court held that a state statute was preempted because of a 
conflict between state and federal law and declined to reassess or apply 
Zschernig, although Zschernig was arguably applicable on the facts of the 
case.110  In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, the National 
Foreign Trade Council challenged a Massachusetts state statute that 
prohibited state entities from buying products from companies that did 
business with Burma.111  The underlying purpose of the law, entitled “An 
Act Regulating State Contracts with Companies Doing Business with or in 
Burma,” was to sanction the Burmese government for human rights 
abuses.112
 
 105. See id. at 331 (“[W]e leave it to Congress—whose voice, in this area, is the 
Nation’s—to evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state 
autonomy.”). 
  However, federal legislation was passed three months after the 
 106. See id. at 323–24 (“[Congress] need not convey its intent with . . . unmistakable 
clarity . . . .”). 
 107. See id. at 311.  The dormant Foreign Commerce Clause limits states’ power to 
impact foreign commerce. See Japan Line Ltd., 441 U.S. at 448 (“In international relations 
and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade the people of the United States act through 
a single government with unified and adequate national power.” (quoting Bd. of Trs. of 
Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933)); see also Jennifer M. Lee, Comment, A 
Match Made in Heaven or a Pair of Star-Crossed Lovers?  Assessing Dormant-Foreign-
Commerce-Clause Limitations on the Wisconsin-China Relationship, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 733, 
737.  Many statutes challenged on foreign affairs preemption grounds are alternatively 
challenged on dormant Foreign Commerce Clause grounds. See, e.g., Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 737 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 108. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as 
Federal Common Law:  A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 865–66 
(1997); Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1699–1703; Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration 
in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121, 163–65 (1994); A.M. 
Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 24–
25 (1995). 
 109. Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism:  State Bargaining and the Dormant 
Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1193 (2000). 
 110. See generally Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
 111. See id. at 366. 
 112. See Brief for Petitioner at 21, Natsios v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 181 F.3d 38 
(1st Cir. 1999) (No. 99-474), 2000 WL 35850, at *5, aff’d sub nom., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).  Although this purpose was clear, the Court did not rely 
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Massachusetts statute was enacted, imposing similar sanctions on the 
Burmese regime.113
Before reaching the Supreme Court, the First Circuit struck down the 
Massachusetts Burma Law for violating the dormant foreign affairs 
power.
 
114  Applying Zschernig, the First Circuit held that the law had 
“more than an incidental or indirect effect on foreign relations,” and was 
thus invalid.115  In so holding, the court noted that the purpose of the law 
was to alter Burma’s human rights policies.116  Further, it relied on a 
slippery slope argument and concluded that the law would have a 
significant effect on foreign affairs in the aggregate if similar laws were 
passed in other states.117  Lastly, the court took into account the views of 
other countries and noted the potential for embarrassment for the United 
States if it were to put forth multiple inconsistent foreign policies.118  In 
invalidating the statute, the First Circuit determined that Barclays Bank 
only pertained to the Foreign Commerce Clause and not analogously to the 
dormant foreign affairs power of Zschernig.119
Many believed that the Supreme Court had granted certiorari to clarify 
the Zschernig confusion.
 
120  However, the Supreme Court declined to 
address the dormant foreign affairs issue, ruling instead that the state statute 
was invalid on conflict preemption grounds and leaving the First Circuit 
decision to stand as dicta.121
In Crosby, the Supreme Court held that the Massachusetts law was 
preempted by the existing federal legislation, even though the federal 
sanctions law did not explicitly prohibit states from making their own 
similar laws to penalize Burma economically.
 
122  Despite no explicit 
conflict, the Court relied on “obstacle preemption”123 and found the state 
statute inconsistent with the federal policy in three ways:  (1) the 
Massachusetts law could detract from Congress’s intent by limiting the 
President’s potential diplomatic and economic leverage,124
 
on the state legislature’s motivation for its decision.  Rather, it held that the state statute was 
an obstacle to complying with the federal sanctions regime. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373. 
 (2) the state law 
undermined the “congressional calibration of force” by using a different 
means to achieve the same ends and by reaching more broadly than the 
 113. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 368. 
 114. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53. 
 115. See id. at 52–53. 
 116. See id. at 53. 
 117. See id. at 53–54. 
 118. See id. at 54. 
 119. See id. at 59. 
 120. See Vázquez, supra note 22, at 1259. 
 121. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000).  Indeed, the 
Crosby Court’s only mention of Zschernig was a reference to the First Circuit’s prior 
opinion, which found that the state act interfered with the federal government’s foreign 
affairs power. See id. at 371; supra notes 114–21 and accompanying text. 
 122. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380. 
 123. Obstacle preemption is a species of conflict preemption, as it operates in the same 
way. See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 434. 
 124. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374–77. 
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federal act,125 and (3) it interfered with the President’s authority under the 
federal sanctions act to represent the United States on the Burma issue.126  
The Court found that the Massachusetts statute was an obstacle to 
Congress’s objectives under the federal sanctions regime.127  Finding that it 
undermined “the intended purpose and ‘natural effect’” of the federal 
sanctions, the Court invalidated the statute.128
After Crosby, the status of Zschernig was as murky as ever.  Despite the 
First Circuit’s showing that Zschernig could have applied, the Crosby Court 
demonstrated its reluctance to rely on or approvingly cite Zschernig, 
indicating its potential demise.
 
129  But on the other hand, the Court did not 
expressly disavow the doctrine, and so it remained for the lower courts to 
struggle with until the Supreme Court addressed it again in Garamendi.130
B.   American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi 
 
This part discusses the Supreme Court’s opinion in American Insurance 
Ass’n v. Garamendi, which invalidated a state law facilitating Holocaust-era 
insurance claims because it conflicted with federal executive policy.  
Part I.B.1 outlines the facts of the Garamendi.  Parts I.B.2 and I.B.3 analyze 
the impact of Garamendi on the two distinct doctrines developed by Crosby 
and Zschernig.   
1.   California’s Holocaust Victim Relief Efforts 
Three years after the Crosby decision, the Supreme Court in Garamendi 
altered the framework of foreign affairs federalism jurisprudence.  In 
Garamendi, the Supreme Court was confronted with a California state 
statute, the California Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA), 
that allowed residents to sue in California state courts on insurance claims 
based on acts perpetrated during the Holocaust.131  The purpose of the 
statute was to facilitate the filing of civil actions for failure to pay insurance 
claims to victims of the Holocaust.132  During the Holocaust, the Nazis had 
seized considerable property belonging to Jews, including the value of 
insurance policies.133  Many of the proceeds from these insurance policies 
were never paid.134  HVIRA required any insurer to disclose information 
about policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945.135
 
 125. Id. at 380. 
  Insurers were 
required to disclose details regarding “life, property, liability, health, 
annuities, dowry, educational, or casualty insurance policies” that were 
 126. See id. at 382–84. 
 127. See id. at 373. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See Schaefer, supra note 24, at 292. 
 130. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 710 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 131. Id. at 401. 
 132. See id. at 426. 
 133. See id. at 402. 
 134. See id. at 402–03. 
 135. See id. at 401. 
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issued to anyone in Europe during that time period.136  A company had to 
disclose information about itself and any “related company,” including 
parents, subsidiaries, reinsurers, successors in interest, managing general 
agents, or affiliates.137  This requirement considered whether the entities 
were currently related, not whether they were related at the time of the 
issuance of the policy.138
At the time of the enactment of HVIRA, the federal government was 
simultaneously involved in obtaining restitution for victims of the 
Holocaust.
 
139  In 2000, the United States and Germany established the 
German Foundation Agreement, which is an executive agreement between 
U.S. President William Clinton and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
that covered many insurance claims caused by German companies, such as 
German banks and insurance companies, during the Nazi era.140  In 
exchange for Germany’s willingness to create a voluntary compensation 
fund, President Clinton agreed to allow Germany some security in litigation 
in the United States.141  Whenever a German company was sued for a 
Holocaust insurance claim in a U.S. court, the U.S. federal government 
agreed to submit a statement attesting that it would be in the United States’ 
interests for the German Foundation to be the exclusive forum and provide 
an exclusive remedy for the claim.142  Further, the federal government 
agreed that it would try to persuade state and local governments to respect 
the Foundation as the exclusive means of resolving Holocaust-era insurance 
claims.143
In Garamendi, the petitioners and the U.S. government argued that the 
federal executive relationship with Germany should preempt HVIRA.
 
144  
Relying heavily on Zschernig, the petitioners contended that California’s 
law interfered with the foreign policy of the executive branch as reflected in 
its executive agreements with Germany.145
2.   Extension of Conflict Preemption 
Under Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council 
 
Garamendi involved executive agreements and accompanying executive 
branch policy.146  There was no pertinent congressional action involved.147
 
 136. See id. at 409 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 3545 (West 2003)). 
  
For the first time, the Supreme Court found a state law preempted by a 
series of executive agreements, combined with letters and statements of 
executive branch officials, which together constituted the federal 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. at 409–10. 
 139. See id. at 405. 
 140. See id. at 405–06. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. at 406. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. at 413. 
 145. See id. at 413, 421, 427. 
 146. See id. at 421, 427, 429. 
 147. See id. at 429 (“Congress has not acted on the matter addressed here.”). 
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government’s mechanisms for securing restitution for claims arising from 
the Holocaust.148
The state law required only disclosure of information, so there was no 
direct conflict with the executive agreements, but the Court noted that the 
state law interfered with the executive policy to have all matters resolved 
through the German Foundation Agreement.
 
149  The Court noted that “[t]he 
basic fact is that California seeks to use an iron fist where the President has 
consistently chosen kid gloves”150 and that “if the [California] law is 
enforceable the President has less to offer and less economic and diplomatic 
leverage as a consequence.”151  Thus, the evidence of a conflict with federal 
law was “more than sufficient to demonstrate that [HVIRA] stands in the 
way of [the President’s] diplomatic objectives.”152
The Garamendi decision was unique:  the Court expanded on Crosby’s 
statutory preemption decision by holding that a foreign policy interest of the 
executive branch alone could preempt an otherwise valid state statute.
 
153  
The Court noted that “the President possesses considerable independent 
constitutional authority to act on behalf of the United States on international 
issues,” and a “conflict with the exercise of that authority” can preempt a 
state law.154
3.   Zschernig v. Miller Further Narrowed 
 
The Garamendi Court not only expanded the reach of conflict 
preemption155 but also discussed the Zschernig decision in detail and 
significantly cut back on where a state law can be invalidated in the absence 
of explicit conflict.156  In relying on conflict preemption but discussing the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine in dicta, the Court demonstrated reluctance 
to invoke Zschernig but acknowledged its continuing survival.157
In dicta, the Garamendi Court suggested a balancing test to cut back on 




 148. See id. at 421 (“The exercise of the federal executive authority means that state law 
must give way where, as here, there is evidence of clear conflict between the policies 
adopted by the two.”); see also Robinson, supra note 
  
Through this new balancing test, the court should look first at whether the 
39, at 659 (“Until Garamendi the Court 
had only held that executive agreements preempted state law where conflict between them 
was explicit.”). 
 149. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 421–22. 
 150. Id. at 427. 
 151. Id. at 424 (alteration in original) (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 
530 U.S. 363, 377 (2000)). 
 152. Id. at 427 (alteration in original) (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 386). 
 153. See Elizabeth Trachy, Comment, State & Local Economic Sanctions:  The 
Constitutionality of New York’s Divestment Actions and the Sudan Accountability & 
Divestment Act of 2007, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1019, 1049 (2011). 
 154. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 424 n.14. 
 155. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 156. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 417–20. 
 157. See Schaefer, supra note 24, at 288–89. 
 158. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11. 
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state is legislating in an area within its traditional capacity.159  Only in the 
narrow situation where the state law affects international affairs and the 
state legislature acts beyond its traditional responsibilities should the court 
apply the dormant foreign affairs doctrine from Zschernig, asking whether 
the state statute had “more than some incidental or indirect effect” on 
foreign affairs.160  The court should also then balance the competing 
interests of the state and federal governments.161  If, however, the state 
action is within its “traditional competence,” the court should require an 
explicit conflict with federal law to invalidate the state action.162  Thus, 
Zschernig’s dormant foreign affairs doctrine is no longer sufficient to 
invalidate a state statute where the state is acting pursuant to its legitimate 
police powers.163  Pursuant to Garamendi, a state law may now permissibly 
have significant foreign affairs effects unless there is a conflict between the 
federal and state laws that invokes Crosby-style conflict (or obstacle) 
preemption.164
C.   Medellín v. Texas 
 
The Court most recently confronted the intersection between federalism 
and foreign affairs in the context of criminal law and executive power in 
2008.165  In Medellín v. Texas, the Court limited the wide reach of 
Garamendi’s conflict preemption decision,166 holding that not every 
assertion of foreign affairs authority by the President will preempt state 
law.167  The defendant in Medellín, a Mexican citizen, was sentenced to death 
in Texas following his capital murder conviction.168  He filed for state 
habeas relief, claiming that Texas violated his rights under the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations because the Mexican consulate was 
never informed of his arrest, as required under the Convention.169
 
 159. See id.  For example, the regulation of insurance is a traditional state responsibility. 
See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a)–(b) (2012); see also Stempel, supra note 
  He was 
2, at 74 (“The state-based nature of insurance law is further enshrined in the federal statutory 
law of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.”). But see FTC v. Travelers Health Ass’n, 362 U.S. 293, 
300 (1960) (noting that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was not intended to permit a state to 
“regulate activities carried on beyond its own borders”). 
 160. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing Zschernig); cf. Garamendi, 
539 U.S. at 419 n.11. 
 161. Cf. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11. 
 162. Cf. id. (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 459 (1968)). 
 163. See Crace, supra note 24, at 223 (“Garamendi . . . seems to indicate that, in the 
absence of conflicting federal action, dormant foreign affairs preemption is [only] possible if 
the state’s action affects foreign affairs without addressing a ‘traditional state 
responsibility.’”). 
 164. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419; see also Crace, supra note 24, at 223 (“[I]t is 
conceivable that, under the majority’s analysis, a state regulation that affects foreign affairs 
but also regulates a ‘traditional state responsibility’ could survive a Garamendi analysis.”). 
 165. See generally Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 166. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 167. Cf. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 530. 
 168. See id. at 501. 
 169. See id. at 501–02. 
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never informed of his right to notify the consulate.170  Mexico successfully 
litigated on behalf of Medellín against the United States in the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ),171 and Medellín appealed to the Texas Court of 
Appeals.172  The ICJ had held that Medellín was entitled to “review and 
reconsideration” of his conviction, despite any contrary domestic rules.173  
President George W. Bush then issued a memorandum ordering the Texas 
Court of Appeals to comply with the ICJ decision.174  The Texas Court of 
Appeals ignored the memorandum and dismissed the case.175  The issues 
before the Supreme Court was whether state courts are bound by ICJ 
decisions and if so, whether the President had the authority to order the 
states to comply.176
The Medellín Court held that the Vienna Convention was not self-
executing and thus not binding on the lower courts without congressional 
action.
 
177  Therefore, President Bush’s memorandum did not preempt the 
Texas Court of Appeals’s decision to dismiss Medellín’s writ of habeas 
corpus.178  The Court acknowledged that it had recognized in Garamendi 
that the exercise of the President’s “narrow and strictly limited authority to 
settle international claims disputes pursuant to an executive agreement” 
may give rise to preemption of inconsistent state action but held that this 
authority was only applicable in a “narrow set of circumstances.”179  Thus, 
the presidential memorandum at issue in Medellín did not carry the same 
binding authority as the executive agreement at issue in Garamendi.180
The Court in Medellín looked to whether the federal action had the force 
of law, rather than choosing whether the state law should be invalidated on 
the basis of conflict preemption or dormant foreign affairs preemption 
according to the guidelines outlined in Garamendi.
 
181  Thus, commentators 
have opined that Medellín is an indication of the Court’s willingness to 
disavow Garamendi’s analysis of foreign affairs preemption.182
 
 170. See id. at 501. 
 
 171. See generally Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 
2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
 172. See generally Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (per curiam); Ex 
parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
 173. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2004 I.C.J. at 73. 
 174. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 503. 
 175. See id. at 504. 
 176. See id. at 498. 
 177. See id. at 530. 
 178. See id. at 525–27. 
 179. See id. at 531–32. 
 180. See Carolyn A. Pytynia, Forgive Me, Founding Fathers for I Have Sinned:  A 
Reconciliation of Foreign Affairs Preemption After Medellin v. Texas, 43 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1413, 1433 (2010). 
 181. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 524. 
 182. See, e.g., Pytynia, supra note 180, at 1429 (“[T]he Supreme Court seemed to 
completely undermine its rationale in Garamendi.”). 
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II.   A TYPOLOGY:  FOUR TYPES OF STATE ACTION THAT INTERSECT WITH 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
Although the foreign affairs preemption doctrines remain messy,183 on a 
broad level, Garamendi has expanded conflict preemption and significantly 
pulled back from the relevance of Zschernig’s dormant doctrine.184
Part II.A first analyzes the set of cases where there is an existing federal 
policy on point, whether executive or statutory, and where conflict 
preemption is the appropriate framework for analysis.  This conflict (or 
obstacle) preemption is in line with the facts and holdings in both Crosby 
and Garamendi.
  Now, 
there are four distinct types of cases that raise concerns regarding the 
tension between federalism and foreign relations.  Each type requires a 
different doctrinal analysis and outcome.  This part discusses these four fact 
patterns separately in light of recent decisions that involve:  (1) state 
sanctions on foreign sovereigns and (2) state efforts to facilitate insurance 
claims for events that occurred abroad. 
185  It analyzes state attempts to impose sanctions on 
foreign governments when the federal government has already imposed 
sanctions.  It first addresses the traditional approach prior to Garamendi, 
and then discusses two recent decisions, one in the Eleventh Circuit and the 
other in the Northern District of Illinois.  These courts confronted state 
attempts to impose sanctions on foreign governments that went beyond 
existing federal policy without express authorization from the federal 
government.186
Part II.B analyzes a second set of cases where the federal government is 
entirely silent on the issue at hand, and the state law attempts to fill in a gap 
in foreign policy.  Pursuant to dicta from Garamendi, this type of case 
requires the same analysis as above while mandating the opposite result.
 
187  
Part II.B discusses the Ninth Circuit’s recent holding in Movsesian v. 
Victoria Versicherung AG.188  There, the court invoked Zschernig to hold a 
California state statute preempted in the absence of any federal policy on 
point, because the California legislature was motivated by a foreign policy 
purpose.189
Part II.C discusses the third and fourth hypothetical types of foreign 
affairs federalism cases:  where the state law intersects with foreign affairs 
and does not directly conflict with federal law, but the state acts beyond its 
traditional police power and either has (1) permissible, incidental, or 
indirect effects abroad (the third category) or (2) impermissible effects 
abroad (the fourth category). 
 
 
 183. See Crace, supra note 24, at 223–24 (“[Garamendi] does not come close to setting a 
clear standard articulating when a state action sufficiently affects foreign affairs to 
necessitate preemption.”). 
 184. See supra Part I.B. 
 185. See supra Part I.B. 
 186. These courts held that the state statutes were not preempted by federal law despite 
the existing federal policy. See infra Part III.A. 
 187. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11; supra Part I.B.3. 
 188. 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013). 
 189. See infra Part II.B. 
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A.   State Sanctions Against Foreign Countries:   
Piling On to Federal Sanctions 
The federal government often uses economic sanctions as a tool to 
increase its leverage on the global stage by isolating a foreign country.190
1.   Historically:  State-Level Action Against South Africa 
  
Any state attempt to add on to an existing federal sanctions regime 
impermissibly conflicts with U.S. foreign policy. 
During the 1980s, decades prior to the Court’s decisions in Crosby and 
Garamendi, states and localities first began experimenting with their own 
sanctions in response to popular opinion about the South African apartheid 
regime.191  States and localities across the United States began enacting 
different forms of sanctions to impact South Africa, which predated any 
federal scheme by several years (because of executive branch hesitation).192  
During that time, approximately half of the states enacted some type of 
divestment statute or indirect law directed to hurt the South African 
apartheid regime.193  Many of these state actions were challenged for 
intruding upon the federal government’s power over foreign affairs 
pursuant to Zschernig.194  For example, in Springfield Rare Coin Galleries 
v. Johnson,195 an Illinois state law exempted all coins from taxation except 
those from South Africa.196  The Supreme Court of Illinois held that this 
was an impermissible interference with federal power over foreign affairs, 
even though tax policy is generally a state power, because the state 
legislature was motivated by its disapproval of the South African apartheid 
regime.197  Then, in 1986, the federal government passed the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act to prohibit U.S. investment in South 
Africa.198  In Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore City,199
 
 190. See Trachy, supra note 
 the 
Maryland Court of Appeals held that city ordinances mandating divestment 
of city pension funds from companies doing business with South Africa 
could be constitutional under Zschernig, depending on the extent of effects 
153, at 1019.  Economic sanctions have been defined as “the 
deliberate, government-motivated withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, ‘of customary trade 
or financial relations.’” See id. (quoting GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, 
KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOT & BARBARA OEGG, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., IN BRIEF:  
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (3d ed. 2007), available at http://www.iie.com/ 
publications/briefs/sanctions4075.pdf). 
 191. See Fenton, supra note 15, at 564–65; see also Peter J. Spiro, State and Local Anti-
South Africa Action As an Intrusion upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. 
REV. 813, 825 (1986). 
 192. See Fenton, supra note 15, at 564–65. 
 193. See Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 821, 822 (1989); see also Schaefer, supra note 24, at 203. 
 194. See infra notes 195–202. 
 195. 503 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 1986). 
 196. See id. at 302. 
 197. See id. at 307. 
 198. See Bd. of Trs. v. Mayor of Balt., 562 A.2d 720, 741 (Md. 1989). 
 199. 562 A.2d 720, 741 (Md. 1989). 
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abroad.200  There, the court found that the city ordinance did not conflict 
with the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act;201 nor did it have a sufficient 
effect on U.S. foreign relations to invalidate the local action under 
Zschernig.202
2.   Applying Crosby and Garamendi 
 
After the state and local sanctions following the South African apartheid 
came a similar wave of state and local sanctions against Burma in the mid-
1990s.203  In Crosby, the Supreme Court held that a state law targeting 
Burma was unconstitutional because the existence of a federal sanctions 
regime created a conflict between state and local policy.204  Pursuant to 
Crosby and Garamendi, a state law should be preempted when it conflicts 
with federal foreign policy or acts as an obstacle to compliance with federal 
foreign policy.205  Accordingly, where there is no gap in federal policy on 
the subject, states are left with no space to legislate in the area.206  When 
states legislate in contravention to this, courts find these state laws 
preempted due to a conflict or obstacle.207  The Eleventh Circuit and the 
Northern District of Illinois were both recently presented with challenges to 
state laws attempting to impose sanctions on foreign countries included on 
the federal government’s list of State Sponsors of Terrorism (SSTs).208  
These state laws were challenged on the basis of an alleged conflict with 
federal law and the federal foreign affairs power.209  Both courts declined to 
hold that the state laws were preempted by federal law, despite the 
existence of the SST list and supplemental federal sanctions.210
3.   Eleventh Circuit Upholds Florida Restriction on Travel to State 
Sponsors of Terrorism 
 
In 2010, the Eleventh Circuit examined the constitutionality of a Florida 
statute that prohibited the use of state money that had been allocated to state 
universities for travel by state employees to countries that the State 
Department has designated as SSTs.211
 
 200. See id. at 746. 
  The limitation applied to both state 
funds and funds contributed by third-party grantors that are administered by 
 201. See id. at 743. 
 202. See id. at 746 (“[T]he effect of the Ordinances on South Africa is minimal and 
indirect.”). 
 203. See Trachy, supra note 153, at 1030–31. 
 204. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 205. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419 n.11 (2003); Crosby v. Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 386 (2000); supra Part I.B. 
 206. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 207. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 208. See Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct 21 (2012); Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 
F. Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 209. See Winn, 616 F.3d at 1207; Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731. 
 210. See Winn, 616 F.3d at 1212; Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731. 
 211. See Winn, 616 F.3d at 1207–08 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 112.061(3)(e), 1011.90(6) 
(2010)). 
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the state.212  Various professors and researchers at Florida state universities, 
along with Florida International University, challenged the statute on 
multiple grounds.213  The district court granted the plaintiffs’ summary 
judgment with respect to the nonstate funds, but denied summary judgment 
with respect to state funds.214  On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the 
plaintiffs contended that the statute impermissibly conflicted with federal 
law.215  Alternatively, they argued that the Florida statute intruded upon the 
federal government’s foreign affairs authority in violation of Zschernig’s 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine.216
Pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979,
 
217 the 
State Department maintains a list of foreign states that have “repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international terrorism.”218  Since 2008, and as 
of this writing, there are four countries designated as SSTs on the State 
Department’s list:  Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria.219  SSTs are subject to 
strict sanctions in four categories.220  These include:  restrictions on U.S. 
foreign assistance, a prohibition on defense exports and sales, control over 
exports of dual-use items, and miscellaneous other restrictions.221  All U.S. 
citizens and entities are prohibited from knowingly engaging in financial 
transactions with any governments of the countries listed as SSTs.222
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the Florida state statute at issue 
dealt with Florida state spending on education.
 
223  It recognized state 
funding and education as distinct, “core issues of traditional and legitimate 
state concern.”224  The court held that the Florida statute “neither conflicts 
with the federal sanctions laws [under Crosby], nor more than incidentally 
invades the realm of federal control of foreign affairs [under Zschernig].”225
 
 212. See id. at 1207–08. 
  
The court held that there was no conflict between state and federal law, 
 213. See id. at 1207. 
 214. See id. at 1208. 
 215. See id. at 1207. 
 216. See id. at 1207, 1211. 
 217. See Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j) (2006). 
 218. Accord Prohibited Financial Transactions, 31 C.F.R. § 596.201 (2009); see U.S. 
DEP’T. OF STATE, STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2014).  This list is “designated pursuant to three laws:  section 6(j) of 
the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A 
of the Foreign Assistance Act.” See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra. 
 219. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 218. 
 220. See id. 
 221. See id.  For a detailed description of the sanctions associated with the SST list, see 
MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32251, CUBA AND THE STATE SPONSORS OF 
TERRORISM LIST 1–2 (2005). 
 222. See 31 C.F.R. § 596.201 (2009) (listing countries designated as supporting 
international terrorism). 
 223. See Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206, 1207–08 (11th Cir. 
2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 21 (2012). 
 224. Id. at 1208. 
 225. Id. at 1211 (“Florida in this Act does not entangle itself with foreign laws or foreign 
officials.”). 
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because of its finding that the Florida statute created only a “brush with 
federal law and the foreign affairs of the United States.”226
The court acknowledged that the federal government has “a lot of laws 
dealing with how foreign countries—including those that sponsor 
terrorism—are to be treated.”
 
227  It nevertheless dismissed such laws as 
irrelevant, noting that they “touch on many subjects, mostly trade and 
financial matters,” and mainly “enable the Executive Branch to tighten or 
loosen sanctions in a discretionary way.”228  They held that these federal 
sanctions do not mandate states to pay for foreign travel for state university 
employees, nor do they prohibit states from differentiating among foreign 
nations when it comes to academic travel.229
Despite acknowledging the lack of a gap in federal sanctions on SSTs, 
the Eleventh Circuit found no conflict and thus upheld the Florida law.
 
230  
It noted several reasons for this decision.231  First, the court cited the 
absence of any federal statute requiring states to pay for foreign travel for 
any state university employees.232  Next, it recognized the absence of any 
federal law prohibiting states from differentiating among foreign nations in 
this regard.233  It noted that Florida had not targeted any specific country 
but rather all countries listed by the State Department as SSTs.234  It cited 
the absence of a “clear and express [federal] foreign policy” regarding 
academic travel that would give rise to a similar conflict as the series of 
executive agreements and supplemental correspondence in Garamendi.235  
It distinguished the Florida law from the Burma sanctions statute in Crosby 
because the Florida law:  (1) only placed restrictions on taxpayer dollars 
and not on individuals or companies that were actually trying to travel or 
trade,236 (2) did not single out one specific country for an economic war,237 
and (3) was narrow, where the law in Crosby was broad.238





 226. Id. at 1208. 
  He noted that “[t]he federal list—state sponsors 
of terrorism—does not by itself have the consequences that Florida attaches 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1208–09. 
 229. See id. at 1208. 
 230. See id. at 1212. But see Odebrecht Constr. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268, 
1290 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that there is a substantial likelihood of success for a claim 
that Florida’s Cuba Amendment, which prevented any company doing business in Cuba 
from bidding on public contracts in Florida, would be preempted by the “extensive federal 
Cuban sanctions regime,” because it reached beyond federal law and undermined 
presidential discretion to dictate U.S. economic policy toward Cuba). 
 231. See Winn, 616 F.3d at 1208–10. 
 232. See id. at 1208. 
 233. See id. 
 234. See id. at 1210. 
 235. See id. at 1211 (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)). 
 236. See id. at 1210. 
 237. See id. 
 238. See id. 
 239. Mike Dorf, Can Florida Have a Foreign Policy?, DORF ON LAW, (Sept. 8, 2010, 
1:09 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/09/can-florida-have-foreign-policy.html. 
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to it, and it is those additional consequences that raise the preemption 
question.”240  He suggested that the Florida law is indistinguishable from 
the Burma sanctions law at issue in Crosby because both were limitations 
on the state’s own expenditures and that the distinctions relied on by the 
Eleventh Circuit were immaterial.241
4.   Northern District of Illinois:   
Illinois Sanctions on Sudan Survive Under Crosby 
 
In the early 2000s, Sudan was facing a serious internal human rights 
crisis in its large province of Darfur, on the border of Libya, Chad, and the 
Central African Republic.242  In 2003, two rebel organizations, the Sudan 
Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, attacked 
Sudanese government interests.243  In response, the Sudanese government 
armed local Arab militias called Jinjaweid, who undertook a campaign of 
ethnic cleansing and forced displacement of the civilian population of 
Darfur.244  The Jinjaweid received substantial support from the Sudanese 
government.245  In exchange, they destroyed Sudanese villages and 
murdered and committed sexual crimes against civilians.246  Two million 
civilians were displaced, and 200,000 people were killed.247  The U.S. 
federal government deemed this to be genocide.248  Sudan has been on the 
federal list of SSTs since 1993.249
 
 240. Id. 
 
 241. Id. 
 242. See ELTIGANI SEISI M. ATEEM, UNITED NATIONS ECON. COMM’N FOR AFR., THE ROOT 
CAUSES OF CONFLICTS IN SUDAN AND THE MAKING OF THE DARFUR TRAGEDY 6 (2007), 
available at http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5425~v~The_root_causes_ 
of_conflicts_in_Sudan_and_the_makink_of_the_Darfur_tragedy.pdf. 
 243. See id. at 6. 
 244. See id. at 7. 
 245. See Sudan:  Government and Militias Conspire in Darfur Killings, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Apr. 23, 2004), http://www.hrw.org/news/2004/04/22/sudan-government-and-
militias-conspire-darfur-killings. 
 246. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 2004:  SUDAN (2005), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41628.htm. 
 247. See Trachy, supra note 153, at 1020. 
 248. See Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-497 § 3(15), 118 
Stat. 4012, 4014 (2004) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)) (Former Secretary 
of State Colin Powell stated, “[w]hen we reviewed the evidence compiled by our team, along 
with other information available to the State Department, we concluded that genocide has 
been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the [Jinjaweid] bear 
responsibility—and genocide may still be occurring”); see also Transcript:  Bush’s Address 
to U.N. General Assembly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2004, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/21/international/21WEB-PTEX.html (quoting President 
George W. Bush as saying, “[a]t this hour, the world is witnessing terrible suffering and 
horrible crimes in the Darfur region of Sudan, crimes my government has concluded are 
genocide”). 
 249. See Lucien J. Dhooge, Darfur, State Divestment Initiatives, and the Commerce 
Clause, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 391, 406 n.77 (2007).  Sudan was originally added 
to this list because it offered sanctuary to any Muslim individual, including numerous 
terrorist leaders such as Osama bin Laden. See id. 
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In 1997, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13067 to freeze 
Sudanese government property located in the United States and to prohibit 
some, but not all, financial transactions with Sudan.250  Executive Order 
13067 enumerated seven specific types of transactions that were prohibited 
between the United States and Sudan.251  In 2002, Congress passed and 
President George W. Bush signed the Sudan Peace Act, which sought to 
facilitate a comprehensive solution to the crisis in Sudan and condemn 
violations of human rights.252  In 2004, the federal government enacted the 
Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, which extended the Sudan Peace Act 
to include the crisis in Darfur.253  The Comprehensive Peace Act instructed 
the President to pursue remedies at the United Nations and also to impose 
unilateral sanctions on Sudan by prohibiting travel to Sudan and freezing 
Sudanese governmental assets.254  In 2006, Congress passed the Darfur 
Peace and Accountability Act, which amended the Comprehensive Peace in 
Sudan Act by further restricting travel and freezing Sudanese assets of 
individuals involved with the ongoing crisis in Darfur.255
The state of Illinois has a tradition of activism in international human 
rights.  In the 1980s, Illinois took action against the South African apartheid 
regime.
 
256  Again in 2005, Illinois enacted a divestment law targeting 
Sudan.257  The Governor of Illinois signed the Act to End Atrocities and 
Terrorism in the Sudan.258  This Act amended two state laws:  the Deposit 
of State Moneys Act and the Illinois Pension Code.259  The amendment to 
the Deposit of State Moneys Act prohibited state investment in financial 
institutions whose customers were connected with Sudan and prohibited 
companies from doing business with or in Sudan.260  The amendment to the 
Illinois Pension Code required divestment of state retirement systems and 
pension funds from companies that maintained defined contacts with 
Sudan.261  The purpose of the Illinois Act as a whole was unambiguously to 
help stop the violence in Sudan.262
 
 250. See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 735 (N.D. Ill. 
2007). 
  Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich was 
 251. See id. 
 252. See id. at 736. 
 253. § 3(15), 118 Stat. at 4014; see Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 736. 
 254. § 3(15), 118 Stat. at 4014; see Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 736. 
 255. Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 109-344, 120 Stat. 1869 (2006); 
see Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 736. 
 256. See, e.g., Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 302 (Ill. 
1986). 
 257. See Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 733.  Numerous other states took action with 
regard to the human rights crisis in Sudan, including Arizona, California, Louisiana, New 
Jersey, and Oregon. See Lucien J. Dhooge, Condemning Khartoum:  The Illinois Divestment 
Act and Foreign Relations, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 245, 274–75 (2006). 
 258. Act to End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan, 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520 / 22.5–.6 
(2005) and 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 1–110.5 (2005); see Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 
733–35. 
 259. See Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 733. 
 260. See id. at 733–34. 
 261. See id. at 733–34, 738. 
 262. See id. at 734 (“The purpose of the Act is clear from its title and its text:  it is 
intended to help stop the atrocities in Sudan.”). 
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quoted upon signing the Act, “[t]his bill sends a clear message to the 
Sudanese government—the people of Illinois will not condone human 
rights abuses and genocide, we will take our money elsewhere.”263
The Illinois Act prohibited all transactions with Sudan, not merely the 
seven types of transactions prohibited by Executive Order 13067.
 
264  It also 
imposed sanctions on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. entities operating legally 
in Sudan and imposed sanctions on foreign countries.265  The federal 
sanctions regime extended to neither of these entities.266
In 2007, the Northern District of Illinois examined the Illinois Sudan Act 
in National Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias.
 
267  It was the first lower 
federal court to address a state sanctions law since Crosby and 
Garamendi.268  The National Foreign Trade Council, some members of 
which had business connections with Sudan, together with Illinois 
municipal pension funds and beneficiaries of public pension funds, sought 
to enjoin enforcement of the Illinois Sudan Act.269  The plaintiffs contended 
that the Act was preempted by federal law on Sudan, or alternatively, that it 
interfered with the federal government’s foreign affairs power.270
The court held that the amendment to the Deposit of State Moneys Act 
was unconstitutional under Crosby, because it “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the national government’s objectives vis-à-vis 
Sudan.”
 
271  The court then noted that the amendment to the Illinois Pension 
Code did not similarly violate the doctrine from Crosby, because federal 
law was silent on the issue of divestment of holdings connected with 
Sudan.272
After analyzing the Act under Crosby, the court then asked whether it 
was an unconstitutional intrusion into foreign affairs under the Zschernig 
framework and came to the same conclusion
 
273:  the amendment to the 
Deposit of State Moneys Act was an unconstitutional intrusion into the 
federal government’s power over foreign affairs,274 but the amendment to 
the Illinois Pension Code was not.275
 
 263. See id. at 735 (citing Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Ends State 
Investment in Sudan (June 25, 2005), available at http://www3.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ 
ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectID=1&RecNum=4097). 
  The court reached this conclusion 
with regard to the Illinois Pension Code because the potential effects abroad 
of the “inability to offer debt or equities to Illinois public pension funds” 
 264. See id. at 733–34, 744; supra notes 250–53 and accompanying text. 
 265. See Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 744–45. 
 266. See id. 
 267. 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 735 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 268. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33948, 
STATE AND LOCAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS:  CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 9 (2013). 
 269. See Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 737. 
 270. See id.  The plaintiffs contended, alternatively, that the Act violated the Foreign 
Commerce Clause or that it was preempted by the National Bank Act. See id. 
 271. See id. at 741. 
 272. See id. 
 273. See id. at 742–46. 
 274. See id. at 745. 
 275. See id. at 745–46. 
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were speculative and insignificant.276  The court stated that the amendment 
to the Illinois Pension Code would have only a “hypothetical impact” on 
foreign policy.277
Relying on Zschernig, and attempting to articulate a general rule for 
foreign affairs preemption, the court implied that it would only find foreign 
affairs preemption where there was clear evidence of a tangible effect of the 
law on federal policy, noting that “Zschernig and Garamendi are both 
concerned with the practical effect a state law might have on the national 
government’s ability to conduct foreign policy on behalf of the United 
States.”
 
278  The court recognized that the overarching purpose of the statute 
was to enact economic sanctions on Sudan and invalidated the amendment 
to the Deposit of State Moneys Act for its impermissible effects abroad.279  
But the amendment to the Illinois Pension Code did not violate Zschernig’s 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine, because its effects abroad were too 
small.280
In response to this decision, Professor Martha F. Davis opined that 
“[c]ourts are ill-equipped to adopt the Giannoulias court’s approach to 
determining which of these subnational initiatives have tangible foreign 
affairs effects that usurp the executive function.”
 
281  Further, she argued 
that the Giannoulias decision is in obvious tension with the strong judicial 
trend in favor of reserving more leeway for the states and localities to 
legislate in areas that impact foreign relations.282
B.   State Action Within Police Power 
 
According to the Garamendi Court, where there is no federal policy on 
point, states are permitted to legislate in areas of traditional state regulation 
even if the state legislation intersects with foreign affairs.283
 
 276. See id. 
  As long as the 
state is acting within its traditional capacity, such state action is only invalid 
 277. See id. at 745. 
 278. Id. at 744; see also Martha F. Davis, Upstairs, Downstairs:  Subnational 
Incorporation of International Human Rights Law at the End of an Era, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 411, 431–32 (2008); Trachy, supra note 153, at 1047. 
 279. See Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 745. 
 280. See id. at 746.  The court ultimately held that the amendment to the Illinois Pension 
Code was unconstitutional in violation of the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. See id. at 
750.  Since Giannoulias, the federal government passed the Sudan Accountability and 
Divestment Act of 2007 (SADA). Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. 
L. No. 110-174, 121 Stat. 2516 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)).  SADA expressly 
authorizes state and local government divestment actions against companies that do business 
with Sudan. Id. § 3(b).  Importantly, SADA proclaims that states acting under this authority 
are “not preempted by any Federal law or regulation.” Id. § 3(g).  SADA specifically 
outlines four mandatory requirements for any state sanction on Sudan, which allows 
divestment to take place in a consistent and predictable manner across the country. Id. § 3(e). 
 281. Davis, supra note 278, at 435. 
 282. Id. at 424 (citing Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)). 
 283. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419 n.11 (2003); Crace, supra note 
24, at 223. 
446 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
if it conflicts with federal policy as in Crosby.284  Thus, where there is no 
federal policy on point but the state acts pursuant to its police power, it is 
inappropriate to invoke Zschernig’s dormant foreign affairs doctrine.285
1.   Litigating Ottoman-Era Life Insurance Claims in California 
 
Between 1915 and 1920, the Ottoman Empire systematically organized 
the killing of approximately 1.5 million of its Armenian population.286  
Another million were deported through “death marches” to the Syrian 
Desert.287
Before this, American and European life insurance companies had begun 
expanding into foreign markets.
 
288  Many educated and urbanized 
Armenians and Greeks sensed instability in the Ottoman Empire and sought 
financial security from insurance policies.289  The insurance companies 
overlooked the political instability in favor of a rapidly growing demand for 
life insurance policies.290
In 1999, a class action lawsuit was filed against New York Life Insurance 
Company (“New York Life”) on behalf of Armenians who claimed benefits 
from life insurance policies that existed during the Ottoman Empire’s reign 
from 1875 to 1923.
 
291  New York Life then moved to dismiss, questioning 
the validity of the forum selection clauses at issue, jurisdiction, and the 
statute of limitations for the insurance contract claims.292  In response, the 
plaintiffs in this litigation teamed up with the California state senate to draft 
the Armenian Genocide Victims Insurance Act.293  This Act extended the 
statute of limitations for victims of the Armenian Genocide to file insurance 
claims until 2010 and granted California courts jurisdiction to adjudicate 
these claims.294  New York Life never challenged the validity of the Act 
itself and that case settled for $20 million in 2004.295  This resulted in a 
distribution of $4,583.33 on average to the heirs of each of 2,400 
policyholders.296
 
 284. E.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000); see 
Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11; supra Part I.A.4, I.B.2. 
 
 285. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11. 
 286. See Stempel, supra note 2, at 3–4. 
 287. See id. 
 288. See id. at 19–20.  New York Life Insurance Company was one of the main players in 
the issuance of life insurance policies to Armenians in the Ottoman Empire before World 
War I. See id. 
 289. See id. at 11, 20 (“Savings in foreign banks and the purchase of life insurance were 
natural responses to the perils faced by Armenians in Turkey.”). 
 290. See id. at 20. 
 291. See Marootian v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 99 Civ. 12073 (CAS), 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22274, at *3–6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2001). 
 292. See id. at *6, *40; see also Stempel, supra note 2, at 47–48. 
 293. See Stempel, supra note 2, at 48. 
 294. See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 2795 (2013). 
 295. See Stempel, supra note 2, at 54. 
 296. See id. 
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2.   The Ninth Circuit Invalidates California Law  
on Armenian Genocide Life Insurance Claims 
In 2003, Vazken Movsesian filed a class action lawsuit against the 
German insurer Münchener Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft 
Aktiengesellschaft (“Munich Re”).297  Munich Re is the sixth largest 
insurance company in the world, the largest reinsurance company in the 
world, and the successor in interest to Victoria Versicherung AG and Ergo 
Versicherungsgruppe AG, two insurers that sold life insurance policies to 
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire prior to 1915.298  In Movsesian, the 
family members and descendants of the holders of these policies joined the 
litigation.299  Munich Re defended the action, disputing the extended statute 
of limitations for breach of contract and contending that it was 
unconstitutional in violation of the federal government’s foreign affairs 
power.300  The trial court held in favor of the plaintiffs but the Ninth Circuit 
first reversed in favor of Munich Re.301  Then the same Ninth Circuit panel 
reversed its own decision, with one of the judges changing her vote in favor 
of the plaintiffs.302  Munich Re then petitioned for rehearing en banc.303
The first Movsesian decision held the California statute invalid on 
conflict preemption grounds.
 
304  In its initial opinion (now overruled), the 
Ninth Circuit opined that the California legislature’s use of the words 
“Armenian Genocide” conflicted with executive foreign policy regarding 
Turkey and the Armenian Genocide.305  The U.S. federal government has 
never formally recognized the occurrence of the Armenian Genocide.306  
The federal policy on the topic is effectively one of nonrecognition.307  But 
to rule on conflict preemption grounds, the court had to point to some 
express federal policy that would invalidate the state statute.308
 
 297. See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian I), 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 
2009), overruled by Movsesian III, 670 F.3d 1067. 
  
Accordingly, it recognized letters from the Bush Administration to the 
House of Representatives discouraging the House from passing resolutions 
 298. See Stempel, supra note 2, at 55. 
 299. See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1070.  New York Life Insurance Company had 
already entered into a settlement. See supra notes 295–96 and accompanying text. 
 300. See Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1055. 
 301. See id. at 1062–63. 
 302. See Movsesian II, 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled by Movsesian III, 670 
F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013). 
 303. See Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Movsesian III, 670 F.3d 
1067, (No. 07-56722). 
 304. See Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1060–61 (“[T]here is an express federal policy 
prohibiting legislative recognition of an ‘Armenian Genocide,’ as embodied 
in . . . statements and letters of the President . . . .”). 
 305. See id. (“The conflict is clear on the face of the statute:  by using the phrase 
‘Armenian Genocide,’ California has defied the President’s foreign policy preferences.”). 
 306. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 5. 
 307. See id. (noting that President Barack Obama avoided the phrase “Armenian 
Genocide” to “avoid alienating Turkey, a NATO ally, which adamantly rejects the genocide 
label”). 
 308. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 425 (2003); Crosby v. Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000). 
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condemning the Genocide.309  Specifically, the Bush Administration, in 
2007, referenced similar legislation that had been passed in France, which 
led to the Turkish military cutting ties with the French military and the 
termination of pending defense contracts between the two nations.310  
Further, in 2000, President Clinton had sent a letter to the House of 
Representatives discouraging the passage of a similar resolution, citing the 
importance of a strong relationship between Turkey and the United States in 
light of conflict in the Middle East.311  Lastly, the court referenced a State 
Department letter from 2003, which stated:  “[W]e oppose HR 193’s 
reference to the ‘Armenian Genocide.’  Were this wording adopted it could 
complicate our efforts to bring peace and stability to the Caucasus and 
hamper ongoing attempts to bring about Turkish-Armenian 
reconciliation.”312  Citing these letters from the executive branch as 
evidence of conflict, the first Movsesian decision expanded upon 
Garamendi by allowing conflict preemption to be based on much less than 
what was allowed in Garamendi.313
In the second Movsesian decision, Judge Dorothy W. Nelson switched 
sides, and the same panel reversed itself and held that the California statute 
was permissible.
 
314  There, the court noted that an express federal policy 
would be necessary to invalidate the state law on conflict preemption 
grounds.315  It also noted that almost forty states had enacted statutes 
officially recognizing the Armenian Genocide.316  The federal government 
had never challenged those statutes.317  If those statutes were permitted to 
stand, the court noted, then this one should be no different.318
In its third and final Movsesian decision, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en 
banc, invalidated the California statute as an unconstitutional intrusion into 
the federal government’s power over foreign affairs.
 
319  The court did not 
address whether there was a conflict between federal policy and the state 
law, and it did not rule on conflict preemption grounds like it did in the first 
Movsesian decision.320  Rather, the court found that it was unnecessary to 
ask whether the California statute conflicted with federal law before moving 
to an analysis under Zschernig.321
 
 309. See Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1059–61. 
  The court then noted that the statute 
would have “‘more than some incidental or indirect effect’ on foreign 
 310. See id. at 1058. 
 311. See id. at 1057. 
 312. See id. at 1058. 
 313. Compare Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415 (finding preemption based on a combination 
of executive agreements and supplemental expressions of executive policy), with Movsesian 
I, 578 F.3d at 1060–61 (lacking any similar official statements of federal policy). 
 314. See Movsesian II, 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled by Movsesian III, 670 
F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013). 
 315. See id. at 903. 
 316. See id. at 907. 
 317. See id. 
 318. See id. 
 319. See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1070. 
 320. See id. at 1072. 
 321. See id. 
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affairs,” thus relying on Zschernig’s dormant foreign affairs doctrine.322  
The Ninth Circuit relied on language from its own case, Von Saher v. 
Norton Simon Museum of Art,323 to find that the “real purpose” of Section 
354.4—to offer a remedy that the plaintiffs could not redeem elsewhere for 
those harmed by human rights abuses during the Armenian genocide—
unconstitutionally infringed on the federal government’s foreign affairs 
power.324  The court found that the state was not addressing a traditional 
state responsibility325 despite dealing with areas usually under state control:  
statutes of limitations326 and insurance contracts.327  According to the en 
banc Ninth Circuit, the underlying motivation of the legislation disqualified 
it from claiming to address an area traditionally under state control.328  
Under Garamendi, where a state is not addressing a traditional state 
responsibility, a conflict between state and federal law is not required for 
invalidation of a state statute on the basis of foreign affairs preemption.329  
Thus, Garamendi would allow for preemption of the California statute 
under Zschernig’s dormant foreign affairs doctrine, solely because it 
touched on international affairs.330
The Movsesian en banc opinion provides an example of a state statute 
that did not conflict with any express federal enactments.
 
331  Yet the Ninth 
Circuit found that the California statute nevertheless infringed on the 
federal government’s power over foreign affairs, resurrecting Zschernig and 
stretching Garamendi by engaging in a motive inquiry and presuming that a 
foreign affairs-minded legislature is incompatible with traditional state 
legislation.332  The court effectively found that permitting American 
plaintiffs to sue German insurers in California impermissibly infringed on 
the federal government’s power over foreign affairs with Turkey, because 
the insurance claims’ basis in the Armenian Genocide might impact U.S. 
relations with Turkey.333
In response to the final Movsesian decision, Professor Jeffrey W. 
Stempel argued that the California statute at issue in Movsesian was clearly 
distinguishable from the Holocaust statute of limitations cases like 
 
 
 322. See id. at 1076. 
 323. 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 324. See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1076–77 (“[I]t is clear that the real purpose of section 
354.4 is to provide potential monetary relief and a friendly forum for those who suffered 
from certain foreign events.”). 
 325. See id. at 1074–75. 
 326. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (instructing federal courts to honor 
the statute of limitations of the state in which they sit). 
 327. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2012); see also Stempel, supra note 
2, at 62 (arguing that “states have traditionally enjoyed wide authority to regulate insurance 
and that state regulation designed to enforce insurance contract commitments serves a 
substantial state interest”). 
 328. See Movsesian III, 670 F.3d at 1076. 
 329. See id. at 1074. 
 330. See id. 
 331. See generally id. 
 332. See id. at 1077. 
 333. See generally id. 
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Garamendi.334  He noted that those cases “presented dramatically more 
federal-state tension than the extended statute of limitations in 
Movsesian,”335 stressing the fact that the federal government has never 
taken a position on the Armenian Genocide.336
Professor Stan Goldman pointed out that the Ninth Circuit declined to 
mention the United States’ ratification of the United Nations Genocide 
Convention and the federal legislation that was enacted afterwards to 
implement it.
 
337  The United States became a signatory to the treaty in the 
late 1980s.338  In implementing the Convention as law, many U.S. 
Congressmen were quoted as accepting the Armenian Genocide as a 
primary reason for its enactment.339  Professor Goldman argued that the 
United States has implicitly recognized the Armenian Genocide in its 
adoption of the Convention, because “[y]ou cannot eliminate from the 
definition of a term the very thing the word was created to describe.”340
Professor Julian Ku expressed disapproval with the Ninth Circuit’s use of 
Zschernig.  He noted: 
 
I am very skeptical of field preemption in this way, and I am not a fan of 
the way the Ninth Circuit questioned the motives of the California 
legislature.  It is not their motives that matter, but whether it is a 
traditional state power.  And since this would give a cause of action in 
California courts against insurance companies already subject to 
California jurisdiction, I don’t think this is a very clear case of field 
preemption.  Nor should the fact that there is a foreign relations impact, 
by itself, turn this into a field preemption case.341
C.   Two Hypothetical Possibilities:  State Action Beyond Police Power 
 
In the words of Professor Matt Schaefer, “Zschernig is alive, but not 
preferred.”342
 
 334. See Stempel, supra note 
  Under Garamendi, the only remaining application of 
Zschernig is where the state acts outside of its traditional role to impact 
2, at 106. 
 335. See id. 
 336. See id. at 107–08. 
 337. See Stan Goldman, Is it Nobody’s Business but the Turks’?:  Recognizing Genocide, 
16 TOURO INT’L L. REV.25, 25–27 (2013).  The United Nations Genocide Convention was 
largely the result of drafting and lobbying by Raphael Lemkin, the man who created the 
word “genocide” to link together the events of the Holocaust and the Turkish massacre of the 
Armenians. See POWER, supra note 1, at 17–78 (detailing Lemkin’s dedication to 
criminalizing genocide internationally); see also Yuval Shany, The Road to the Genocide 
Convention and Beyond, in THE UN GENOCIDE CONVENTION:  A COMMENTARY 3, 7 (Paola 
Gaeta ed., 2009) (discussing the use of Lemkin’s term “genocide”); Goldman, supra, at 29–
30. 
 338. See generally LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE 
CONVENTION 1–2 (1991). 
 339. See Goldman, supra note 337, at 33–35. 
 340. Id. at 36. 
 341. Julian Ku, Will the Supreme Court Revisit Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption in 
California’s Armenian Genocide Law?, OPINIO JURIS (May 16, 2013, 1:11 PM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/05/16/will-the-supreme-court-revisit-dormant-foreign-affairs-
preemption-in-californias-armenian-genocide-law/. 
 342. Schaefer, supra note 24, at 307. 
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foreign policy on a subject that the federal government has not already 
addressed.343  If Zschernig is the appropriate framework for analysis, the 
state action will be invalidated if it has more than an incidental or indirect 
effect on foreign affairs and upheld if it has only incidental or indirect 
effects.344
These two scenarios are largely hypothetical, as there are two mandatory 
prerequisites now to properly invoke Zschernig as a framework for 
analysis:  (1) no federal enactment on point and (2) a state acting outside of 
its traditional role.
 
345  Where these two prerequisites are not met, conflict 
preemption is the appropriate framework for analysis,346 and the state 
statute will either fail because it conflicts with federal policy or survive 
because it does not conflict.347
III.   PROHIBITING “PILE ONS,” PERMITTING POLICE POWER:   
A SUPREMACY CLAUSE ANALYSIS IS ALMOST ALWAYS APPLICABLE 
UNDER GARAMENDI 
 
When faced with a state statute that intersects with foreign affairs, 
pursuant to Garamendi, the court should ask a series of specific questions to 
determine where the case fits in the four-part framework outlined in Part 
II.348  Because of the murkiness of Supreme Court precedent on the issue, 
lower courts should strive to follow the Court’s most recent “clarification” 
of the tension between federalism and foreign relations—Garamendi.349
A court presented with a state law that intersects with foreign affairs 
should first ask if there is a conflict with any existing federal law.  A 
conflict exists if there is any federal policy that touches on the same subject, 
or addresses the same foreign country in the same way, or is explicitly 
intended to be comprehensive.
  In 
interpreting Garamendi’s expansion of conflict preemption and narrowing 
of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, courts should follow consistent 
guidelines depending on the type of case that they are presented with 
pursuant to the typology outlined in this Note. 
350  If there is a conflict, the state action fits 
into the category discussed above in Part II.A and should be preempted 
pursuant to Crosby.351
 
 343. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419 n.11 (2003). 
  If there is no existing federal law on point, there is 
 344. See supra Parts I.A.2–4, II.B. 
 345. See supra Parts I.A.2–4, II.B. 
 346. See supra Part II.A. 
 347. See supra Part II.A; see also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 
(2000). 
 348. See supra Part II. 
 349. For a theoretical alternative to the framework put forth in Garamendi, see Marc P. 
Epstein, Note, Comity Concerns Are No Joke:  Recognition of Foreign Judgments Under 
Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2317, 2355–56 (2014) (arguing 
that the Garamendi balancing test is too “difficult and ambiguous,” and advocating instead 
for an objective standard, wherein federal law would preempt state law where “another 
sovereign would reasonably expect the federal government to have exclusive jurisdiction 
over a type or body of law”). 
 350. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 351. See supra Parts I.B.2, II.A. 
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no conflict,352 and the court should then ask whether the state has acted 
pursuant to its traditional police power.353  If the state has acted pursuant to 
its traditional police power, then the state action fits into the category 
discussed above in Part II.B and should be upheld, pursuant to Garamendi 
dicta.354  If the state has acted outside its traditional responsibilities and 
beyond its police power, the court has one more question to ask.  Only if the 
state has acted beyond its traditional police power should the court then 
resort to Zschernig and ask whether the state statute has more than an 
incidental or indirect effect on foreign affairs.355  If it does, then the state 
action should be preempted pursuant to Zschernig.356  If it does not have 
such impermissible effects, then the court should uphold the state action 
pursuant to Zschernig.357
This part’s four sections each correspond to distinct types of state action 
discussed in this Note.  Additionally, the lower court cases are classified by 
type.  Part III.A argues that, pursuant to Crosby and Garamendi, and 
contrary to the holdings in both Faculty Senate of Florida International 
University v. Winn
 
358 and Giannoulias, states cannot enact sanctions on 
foreign governments when the federal government has already implemented 
sanctions.  Next, Part III.B argues that Garamendi allows states to legislate 
pursuant to their traditional state police powers in areas that intersect with 
foreign policy when the federal government has not acted.  Where there is a 
gap in federal foreign policy, states should be permitted to fill in the gap.  
Although the federal government should undoubtedly be the voice of the 
nation,359
A.   Prohibiting State “Pile Ons” to Federal Foreign Policy 
 it is infeasible to allow gaps to go unfilled.  Part III.C argues that 
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine from Zschernig only applies in an 
extremely limited and largely hypothetical set of cases where the states are 
acting beyond their traditional police power and that courts have 
misinterpreted Garamendi in continuing to apply Zschernig broadly. 
In both Winn and Giannoulias, the courts were presented with a state’s 
attempt to impose economic sanctions on foreign governments, where the 
federal government had already enacted a comprehensive sanctions regime 
aimed at the same country or countries.360  Both the Eleventh Circuit and 
the Northern District of Illinois were mistaken in upholding parts of state 
statutes that added on to an existing federal sanctions regime.361
 
 352. See supra Part I.A.4. 
  These 
 353. See supra Part I.B. 
 354. See supra Parts I.B.3, II.B.  This also reflects the concerns of Justice Harlan in his 
concurring opinion in Zschernig. See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra Parts I.B.3, II.C. 
 356. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 357. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 358. 616 F.3d 1206, 1207–08 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 21 
(2012). 
 359. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 360. See supra Part II.A.3–4. 
 361. See supra Part II.A.3–4. 
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courts were incorrect in their analyses because Crosby and Garamendi 
instruct that, if there is no gap in federal policy, state laws dealing with the 
same subject matter should be preempted because they create an obstacle to 
compliance with federal law.362
Such an outcome is not only consistent with Supreme Court precedent, it 
is preferable from a policy standpoint.  States should not be permitted to 
add on to any existing federal foreign policy, where the policy is thought to 
be exhaustive.  Permitting states to add on to existing federal foreign policy 
creates uncertainty abroad and uncertainty across the states and localities as 
to the extent to which they can permissibly supplement existing federal 
policy.  Permitting such “pile ons” might encourage retaliatory action from 
foreign entities, directed at the United States as a whole or at individual 
states.  It could create a significant problem in the aggregate:  many states 
targeting a foreign country could have a significant effect abroad even 
though each on its own might not.  Moreover, permitting states to pile on to 
national foreign policy would discourage the federal government from 
expressly indicating when state and local action is actually permissible, as it 
has done in its most recent sanctions law against Sudan.
 
363
1.   Faculty Senate of Florida International University v. Winn 
  Indeed, the U.S. 
federal government should strive to minimize ambiguity in federal law by 
encouraging Congress to include express nonpreemption clauses in its laws.  
Where feasible, the federal government should articulate an explicit policy 
to increase predictability around the country and the world and make the 
legislative process more efficient. 
In Winn, the federal SST list provided a list of countries to which the 
state action would apply.364  The Florida statute prohibited the use of state 
money—in state universities—for travel by state university employees to 
SSTs.365  The Eleventh Circuit upheld the statute, finding that it neither 
conflicted with federal law pursuant to Crosby366 nor intruded into the 
federal government’s foreign policy domain under Zschernig.367
The Eleventh Circuit correctly applied Garamendi in finding Zschernig 
inapplicable, because the state was legislating in the areas of education and 
state funding pursuant to its police power.
 
368  However, the Eleventh 
Circuit misapplied Garamendi with respect to Crosby.369  The Florida law 
should have been invalidated on obstacle—or conflict—preemption 
grounds pursuant to Crosby.370
 
 362. See supra Part I.A.4, I.B.2. 
  Federal law provides for four distinct 
categories of strict sanctions for countries on the SST List, and explicitly 
 363. See supra note 280. 
 364. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 365. See supra notes 211–14 and accompanying text. 
 366. See supra notes 225–31 and accompanying text. 
 367. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 368. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 369. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 370. See supra Part I.A.4, I.B.2. 
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bars all U.S. citizens from financial transactions with SSTs.371  There is 
thus no gap in federal sanctions on SSTs, but Florida’s law adds on to the 
comprehensive federal regime.  The Eleventh Circuit distinguishes the 
Massachusetts sanctions at issue in Crosby,372 but the distinction between 
restricting taxpayer dollars and restricting actual travel is immaterial.373
2.   National Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias 
  
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit should have held that the Florida statute 
was preempted by the federal SST list and its accompanying sanctions. 
Similarly, the Northern District of Illinois in Giannoulias found that the 
pension fund divestment at issue was not an obstacle to the accomplishment 
of Congress’s objectives on its Sudan policy and would survive a conflict 
preemption analysis.374  Thus, the court relied on Crosby in finding that 
Illinois’s amendment to the Pension Code would have been found 
constitutional if not for the Foreign Commerce Clause issue.375  But there 
already existed a comprehensive system of federal statutes dealing with 
Sudan, so the court should have invalidated the amendment to the Pension 
Code pursuant to Crosby.376
In Giannoulias, the court looked into whether the pension funds’ inability 
to purchase securities of companies doing business in Sudan would have 
been likely to affect decisions to do business in Sudan.
 
377  However, 
Crosby calls for an inquiry into “the federal statute as a whole and 
identifying its purpose and intended effects.”378  The purpose of the federal 
statutory regime was to impose a unified and comprehensive system of 
sanctions on Sudan.379  This effect is impossible if there are state statutes 
that add on to the federal statutory regimes.  Crosby does not command a 
reviewing court to look for gaps in an existing federal regime.380  The 
existence of a comprehensive federal regime is prohibitive for the states, 
outside of an express delegation of authority in the federal law.381
The purpose of the amendment to the Illinois Pension Fund, as well as of 
the rest of the Illinois Sudan Act, was to hurt the Sudanese government 
economically.
 
382  The Northern District of Illinois found that this purpose 
was unlikely to be accomplished, given the nature of the Illinois Pension 
Fund.383
 
 371. See supra notes 
  But if the state act had brought about the desired effects of the 
Illinois legislature, it would have frustrated the purpose of the federal 
220–22 and accompanying text. 
 372. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 373. See supra notes 239–41. 
 374. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 375. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 376. See supra Part I.A.4, I.B.2. 
 377. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 378. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). 
 379. See supra notes 249–57 and accompanying text. 
 380. See supra Part I.A.4, I.B.2. 
 381. See, e.g., supra note 280. 
 382. See supra notes 262–67 and accompanying text. 
 383. See supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
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sanctions regime.  It is counterintuitive to uphold a statute because it will 
not ever have the effects intended by the legislature in enacting the statute.  
The amendment to the Illinois Pension Fund should have been held 
preempted under Crosby and Garamendi as an obstacle to the achievement 
of the goals of the existing federal policy on Sudan. 
B.   Permitting States to Fill Gaps in Foreign Policy  
Pursuant to Police Power 
Garamendi instructs that state action that does not conflict with any 
federal policy may intersect with foreign affairs, so long as the state is 
acting pursuant to its police power.384
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “police power” as “[a] state’s Tenth 
Amendment right, subject to due-process and other limitations, to establish 
and enforce laws protecting the public’s health, safety, and general welfare, 
or to delegate this right to local governments.”
 
385
Allowing states to act pursuant to their police power in areas where the 
federal government has left a distinct gap is preferable to leaving these 
spaces unfilled for the following reasons:  First, there is a strong argument 
that it would be contrary to the Tenth Amendment to prohibit a state from 
acting where the federal government has taken no action.
 
386  Next, state and 
local governments are often more responsive to the desires of their 
constituencies, and so they are the most pragmatic governmental bodies to 
quickly and efficiently deal with issues that arise.387  For instance, a large 
number of citizens in California of Armenian descent is grounds for a 
strong public policy in favor of allowing descendants of victims of the 
Armenian Genocide to collect on life insurance claims.  Furthermore, 
allowing states to fill in gaps in foreign policy might persuade the federal 
government to enact a more complete foreign policy that would increase the 
consistency and predictability of U.S. policy abroad.  Lastly, Garamendi’s 
expansion of the applicability of conflict preemption to executive policy 
means that gaps in federal policy will not be so readily found.388
The Ninth Circuit miscategorized the Movsesian case as an issue of “field 
preemption” that implicated Zschernig rather than as a permissible exercise 
of California’s police power.  In that case, the Ninth Circuit correctly 
recognized that compensation for victims of the Armenian genocide does 
not conflict with federal policy because there is no existing federal policy 
with which to conflict.
  Gaps will 
thus only exist where there is a true lack of any federal foreign policy, and 
states should be permitted to fill in this space, however limited it is. 
389  Indeed, no federal policy is possible if the federal 
government has never spoken on the issue.390
 
 384. See supra note 
  Because there is no federal 
163 and accompanying text. 
 385. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1345 (10th ed. 2014). 
 386. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 387. See supra note 15. 
 388. See supra Part I.B.2. But see supra Part I.C. 
 389. See supra notes 320–24 and accompanying text. 
 390. See supra notes 306–09 and accompanying text. 
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statute or executive policy on Turkish compensation for genocide victims, 
the state statute cannot be preempted on the basis of conflict preemption 
because there is no discernible conflict with foreign policy. 
The statute at issue in Movsesian should have been upheld because:  
(1) there was no conflict with federal law391 and (2) the state acted pursuant 
to its traditional police power to regulate both insurance claims against 
companies subject to personal jurisdiction in California, and statutes of 
limitations in general.392  The Ninth Circuit recognized that the federal 
government’s policy on the Armenian Genocide was insufficient to be 
considered a concrete policy for conflict preemption,393 which is why it 
stretched the bounds of Garamendi in its application of “field preemption” 
from Zschernig to preclude the claims from going forward.  Undoubtedly, 
the Ninth Circuit accepted that the federal government should not be 
permitted to have an inactive, silent foreign policy that is available only to 
preempt state law.  If force of law is what matters now for conflict 
preemption,394
Importantly, the Ninth Circuit was incorrect in its interpretation of dicta 
from Garamendi and its broad application of Zschernig.  In Movsesian, the 
court found that there was no conflict with federal law, and analyzed the 
statute under Zschernig because it found that the California legislature’s 
foreign policy purpose disqualified it from claiming to act pursuant to its 
police power.
 a nonexistent federal policy certainly does not carry the 
force of law. 
395  Yet despite the Ninth Circuit’s insistence, having a 
foreign policy purpose is not relevant in the inquiry whether a state is acting 
pursuant to its police power.396  The court thus incorrectly analyzed the 
case under Zschernig’s dormant foreign affairs doctrine—or “field 
preemption”397—and the corresponding dicta from Garamendi.398  In doing 
so, the Ninth Circuit avoided expanding the explicit conflict preemption 
holding of Garamendi but was still able to invalidate the statute that would 
have allowed for millions of Armenians to collect from the breach of their 
ancestors’ life insurance contracts.399
C.   Zschernig Analysis Is Appropriate Only Where  
the State Acts Beyond Its Traditional Police Power 
 
The only situation where Garamendi allows for foreign affairs 
preemption in the absence of a conflict is when the state acts beyond its 
constitutionally delegated police power and the state action has more than 
an incidental or indirect effect on foreign affairs.400
 
 391. See supra notes 
  Such analysis under 
306–09, 320–24 and accompanying text. 
 392. See supra notes 326–30 and accompanying text. 
 393. See supra notes 306–09, 320–24 and accompanying text. 
 394. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 395. See supra notes 324–30 and accompanying text. 
 396. See supra note 341 and accompanying text. 
 397. See supra notes 319–32 and accompanying text. 
 398. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 399. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 400. See supra Parts I.B.3, II.C. 
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Zschernig is appropriate only after the court has found that there is no 
conflict between federal and state policy, and the state is acting beyond its 
police power.401  Then it requires only an analysis of the effects of the state 
action.402
Limiting the applicability of Zschernig is preferable because, given the 
expansion of conflict preemption in the past two decades,
 
403 a dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine is now superfluous.  Previously, courts may have 
found the dormant foreign affairs doctrine necessary because there was 
uncertainty about the preemptive reach of existing federal law.  Today, 
given the Court’s expansion on conflict preemption in foreign affairs law in 
both Crosby and Garamendi,404 and despite the possible limitations of 
Medellín,405 the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is unnecessary to 
invalidate state laws merely for tangentially intersecting with foreign 
affairs.  Because of continuing globalization, state and local action will 
increasingly intersect with foreign affairs.406
CONCLUSION 
  It is thus unnecessary and 
unproductive to litigate over state and local action in the absence of any 
conflicting federal policy. 
Given the tumultuous history of court decisions in the realm of foreign 
affairs and federalism, it is unsurprising that lower courts have struggled 
with Supreme Court precedent.  Despite lower courts’ assertions to the 
contrary, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine of the Cold War has not 
persisted.  And given increasing globalization, it is infeasible to 
categorically prohibit state and local action from sporadically overlapping 
with foreign policy.  Pursuant to Garamendi, the states can legislate in areas 
that intersect with foreign relations, even if their motivation is to impact 
foreign affairs, as long as they act pursuant to their traditional police power.  
 
 401. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 402. See supra Part I.A.3, I.B.3.  A key question persists:  How do we determine which 
effects abroad are incidental or indirect, instead of permissible?  On top of mistakenly 
applying Zschernig where analysis under Crosby was appropriate, even if a Zschernig 
analysis had been appropriate, the Ninth Circuit in Movsesian misapplied the Zschernig 
effects test.  The court merely cited the purpose of the state law, the effects of other 
countries’ recognitions of the Armenian genocide, and Turkey’s views of the issue to 
determine that it was an unconstitutional state action, rather than looking at the extent of the 
law’s effects abroad. See supra notes 324–32 and accompanying text.  Thus, “[t]he fact that 
Turkey abhors the term ‘Armenian Genocide’ and that the President does not want to upset 
Turkey was enough to overturn an official act of a sovereign state legislature.” Stempel, 
supra note 2, at 107; see also Movsesian III, 670 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) 
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matter of foreign policy around the world.”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2795 (2013).  This was 
an incorrect determination because only the actual effects abroad of the legislation would be 
relevant under a Zschernig analysis, and it is unlikely that a statute affecting insurance 
companies that already operate in California would have significant effects abroad. See 
supra note 341 and accompanying text. 
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However, Garamendi does not allow states to add on to existing federal 
laws unless Congress expressly delegates such authority to the states.  
Adhering to the Garamendi-consistent typology developed in this Note 
might persuade the federal government to build a more comprehensive 
foreign policy, minimize gaps and ambiguity in U.S. foreign policy, and 
increase judicial efficiency. 
